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120-Day Time Limit for Bringing a Summary Judgment Motion Properly Extended by Stipulation

The Fourth Department determined the 120-day time limit for making summary judgment motions (after the filing of a note of issue) was properly extended by stipulation.  The dissent felt that such a stipulation was invalid because it violated public policy: “While we agree with our dissenting colleague that the court was not required to accept the express stipulation of the parties to extend the 120-day deadline in CPLR 3212, we note that the court in fact did so in advance of the motion … . Moreover, unlike our dissenting colleague, we do not view the timing requirements applicable to motions for summary judgment as a matter of public policy that may not be affirmatively waived by a party …”. Bennett v St. John’s Home & St. John’s Health Care Corp., 2015 NY Slip Op 03952, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

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