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CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s sexual abuse conviction, which was based solely on defendant’s confession, was against the weight of the evidence:

CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of such a confession: “A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” Here, there is no such corroboration. The People assert that defendant’s confession “was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the child victim and her numerous hearsay disclosures solicited by the defense.” The record does not support that assertion, however, inasmuch as the victim never testified that she touched defendant’s penis with her hand, and there is no other evidence—hearsay or otherwise—independent of defendant’s confession to support defendant’s conviction of sexual abuse. Although it is well settled that “additional proof need not corroborate every detail of the confession,’ ” we conclude that defendant’s conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree was “based solely on [defendant’s] uncorroborated [confession]” … . Since there was “no corroborating proof of whatever weight,’ [count two of the indictment] must be dismissed” … . People v Maynard, 2016 NY Slip Op 06573, 4th Dept 10-7-16

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