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Jury’s Failure to Award Damages for Future Pain and Suffering Did Not Warrant Setting Aside Verdict

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict based upon the jury’s failure to award damages for future pain and suffering.  The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

In determining a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence, the court must decide whether the evidence so preponderates in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence … . Resolution of the motion does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors … . Moreover, “[g]reat deference is accorded to the fact-finding function of the jury, and determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the factfinders, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses” … . Thus, “[w]here the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the jury’s failure to award damages for future pain and suffering was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented at trial, with consideration given to the credibility of the witnesses and the drawing of reasonable inferences therefrom, and there was no basis in the record for the trial court to disturb the jury’s resolution of credibility issues against the plaintiff … . Raso v Jamdar, 2015 NY Slip Op 01934, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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