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Child’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse One Year After Abuse Ended Properly Admitted Under the “Prompt Outcry” Exception to the Hearsay Rule

The Second Department determined a child’s disclosure of sexual assault one year after the abuse ended was properly admitted under the “prompt outcry” exception to the hearsay rule:

Evidence that a sexual assault victim promptly complained about the incident is admissible to corroborate the allegation that an assault took place … . “An outcry is prompt if made at the first suitable opportunity’ …, and is a relative concept dependent on the facts’ … . “There can be no iron rule on the subject. The law expects and requires that it should be prompt, but there is and can be no particular time specified” … . “[W]hat might qualify as prompt in one case might not in another” … .

Here, the trial court permitted testimony concerning the victim’s first “outcry” to a friend which occurred approximately one year after the abuse had ended … . Under all of the circumstances of this case, including the victim’s young age, and the fact that she lived with the defendant during the relevant period, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the victim’s outcry to her friend … . People v Caban, 2015 NY Slip Op 01959, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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