You are here: / / Abuse of Discretion to Grant Motion for Leave to Amend Answer On the Eve...

Abuse of Discretion to Grant Motion for Leave to Amend Answer On the Eve of Trial

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted defendant’s motion for leave to amend his answer, which was made long after the action had been certified for trial:

While leave to amend a pleading shall be freely granted (see CPLR 3025[b]), a motion for leave to amend is committed to the broad discretion of the court … . “In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the party seeking the amendment was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated [and] whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered” … . Generally, in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … .

“However, where the application for leave to amend is made long after the action has been certified for trial, judicial discretion in allowing such amendments should be discrete, circumspect, prudent, and cautious'” … . “Moreover, when . . . leave is sought on the eve of trial, judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly” … . Yong Soon Oh v Hua Jin, 2015 NY Slip Op 00362, 2nd Dept 1-14-15

 

You might also like
MOTHER ALLEGED SHE MADE PAYMENTS TO THIRD PARTIES IN THIS SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING; FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO REIMBURSE MOTHER WITHOUT PROOF THE PAYMENTS WERE IN FACT MADE BY MOTHER (SECOND DEPT).
Anticipatory Repudiation Cause of Action Stated;Four-Year UCC Statute of Limitations Applied
Trial Court’s Batson Ruling Re: Pretextual Reasons for Exclusion of White Jurors Upheld
LEGAL DOCUMENTS, BILLS FOR LEGAL SERVICES AND AN INSURER’S FILE PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OR CONDITIONAL IMMUNITY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED DISCLOSURE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON SNOW FIVE HOURS AFTER THE “EXTRAORDINARY SNOWSTORM” HAD ENDED; THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AND DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Firefighter’s Injury Was Proximately Caused by Driver’s Negligent Operation of His Car Under the “Danger Invites Injury” Doctrine—Firefighter Was Injured Removing Injured Driver from His Car After an Accident
DEFENDANT’S INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY REQUIRED A MORE PROBING COLLOQUY BEFORE ACCEPTING THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).
Policy Exclusions Not Affected by Additional Insured Endorsement

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Supreme Court Properly Denied a Motion to Approve a Settlement of a Proposed... Father’s Recording of Defendant’s Berating and Threatening Father’s...