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Criteria for Common Law Indemnification Explained (Not Met Here)—Property Owner Could Not Seek Indemnification from Independent Contractor Re: Dangerous Condition on the Property

In the context of a personal injury action based upon a dangerous condition, the Second Department explained the criteria for common law indemnification.  Here the dangerous condition was on property built by an independent contractor, Ambrosio, and owned by Wincoma.  Wincoma did not demonstrate it met the criteria for seeking indemnification from Ambrosio:

“The principle of common-law, or implied, indemnification permits one who has been compelled to pay for the wrong of another to recover from the wrongdoer the damages it paid to the injured party” … . “If . . . an injury can be attributed solely to negligent performance or nonperformance of an act solely within the province of [a] contractor, then the contractor may be held liable for indemnification to an owner” … . A party that has actually participated in the wrongdoing is not entitled to indemnification … .

Here, the record demonstrates that Wincoma, the owner of the property where the subject incident occurred, had actual and constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition which caused the plaintiff’s injuries … . Moreover, the record shows that the injury cannot be attributed solely to the negligent performance or non-performance of an act solely within the province of Ambrosio, which was an independent contractor … . Ambrosio built the subject structure approximately one year prior to the accident, the structure was built pursuant to specifications provided by Wincoma, and the record shows that those specifications were not “patently defective” … . Consequently, Wincoma could not be entitled to common-law indemnification from Ambrosio for any damages that may be assessed against it in this action … . Rappel v Wincoma Homeowners Assn, 2015 NY Slip Op 01434, 2nd Dept 2-18-15

 

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