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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN THROWN FROM A RENTED MOPED; THE RENTAL AGREEMENT INCLUDED AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; HOWEVER, THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; NEGLIGENCE AND WRONGFUL-DEATH CAUSES OF ACTION ARE DISTINCT AND ADDRESS DIFFERENT INJURIES; THE WINNING ISSUE WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCormack, determined the plaintiffs in this wrongful death action, who are the parents of plaintiffs’ decedent and the administrators of decedent’s estate, are not bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate. The decedent rented an electric moped from defendant Ravel by downloading an app with an arbitration clause. Decedent was killed when he was thrown from the moped and struck by a car. All agreed that the negligence causes of action were subject to the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs successfully argued the wrongful death action is distinct from the negligence actions and is not subject to the arbitration clause. The winning argument was first raised on appeal. The court heard the appeal because it “present[ed] a pure question of law that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided if raised at the proper juncture” …:

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs, individually, did not enter into an agreement with Revel to arbitrate. However, the plaintiffs are the administrators of the decedent’s estate, and the causes of action arise from the same incident that caused the decedent’s death. The issue, therefore, turns on the nature of wrongful death causes of action and whether they are derivative of negligence causes of action or independent of negligence causes of action. * * *

The law of this State is clear that a wrongful death cause of action is a separate and distinct cause of action to redress the injuries suffered by a decedent’s distributees as a result of the decedent’s death. “‘A cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death is a property right belonging solely to the distributees of the decedent and vests in them at the decedent’s death'” … . This is true even where no cause of action alleging negligence exists. * * * … [T]his Court [has] determined that a cause of action alleging wrongful death was not derivative of a negligence cause of action, but [is] an independent cause of action vested in the distributees. “… [T]he surviving personal injury action and the wrongful death cause of action … are different in many respects. The two causes of action exist in order to protect the rights of different classes of persons, and the measure of damages is entirely different” … . “Wrongful death actions are brought not to compensate the decedent or his [or her] estate for the pain and suffering attendant to the injury, but rather to recover, on behalf of decedent’s distributees, the pecuniary value of the decedent’s life” … . Further, the different causes of action accrue at different times. A negligence cause of action accrues at the time of the injury, while a wrongful death cause of action does not accrue until the decedent’s death, which can occur after the injury is sustained … . Marinos v Brahaj, 2025 NY Slip Op 03561, Second Dept 6-11-25

Practice Point: Negligence and wrongful death causes of action are distinct and address different injuries. Here an arbitration clause in a moped rental contract executed to by plaintiffs’ decedent was deemed to apply to the negligence causes of action stemming from the moped accident, but not to the related wrongful death cause of action.​

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an example of when an issue raised for the first time on appeal will be considered by the appellate court.

 

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