You are here: / / Restrictive Covenants in Homeowners’ Association’s Declaration...
,

Restrictive Covenants in Homeowners’ Association’s Declaration Do Not Apply to Land Along a Road Which Had Been Dedicated by the Association to the Town

The Third Department determined a homeowners’ association (HPHA) could not restrict the placement of a political sign on property along a road which had been dedicated to the town.  Because there was no evidence the HPHA reserved the right to regulate signs on the strip of land transferred to the town, the HPHA had no authority to prohibit the placement of a sign on the land:

Respondents contend that, although Hudson Pointe, Inc. dedicated land to the Town for the purpose of maintaining the roads within the development, such dedication was subject to the restrictive covenants contained in HPHA’s Declaration. Thus, according to respondents, although petitioners’ political signs were located on Town property, HPHA maintained the authority to enforce its sign restriction on this public land. Generally, the process of dedication is “of the nature of a gift by a private owner to the public” …, and dedication requires, among other things, “absolute relinquishment to public use by the owner” …. Thus, a town may acquire a road in fee through dedication “when there has been a complete surrender to public use of the land by the owners, acceptance by the town, and some formal act [by public authorities] adopting the highway . . . coupled with a showing that the road was kept in repair or taken in charge by public authorities” (…see Highway Law § 171///).

While the record is devoid of evidence of the Town’s acceptance of ownership of the roads within the development, the parties do not dispute that the land in question is owned by the Town through dedication. The 1997 deed conveying certain property within the development from Hudson Pointe, Inc. to the Town, contained in the record, does not explicitly reserve to HPHA or Hudson Pointe, Inc. any interest in the conveyed property. In the absence of such reservation, respondents lack the authority to enforce HPHA’s sign restriction on Town land as a matter of law … . Matter of Jasinski v Hudson Pointe Homeowners Assn Inc, 2015 NY Slip OP 00274, 3rd Dept 1-8-15

 

You might also like
MOTHER WAS NOT GIVEN THE CHANCE TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS FORMING THE BASIS OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT MOTHER VIOLATED A VISITATION ORDER, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).
THIRD DEPT DECLINED TO EXERCISE ITS INTEREST OF JUSTICE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF THE RIGHTS SHE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).
“Mystery Shopper” Not an Employee
PETITIONER SEX OFFENDER’S APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF HIS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION WAS MOOT BECAUSE APPROPRIATE HOUSING HAD BEEN FOUND WHILE THE APPEAL WAS PENDING; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED THE APPEAL UNDER THE EXCEPTION-TO-THE-MOOTNESS-DOCTRINE AND REITERATED THAT WHEN A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER HAS COMPLETED HIS MAXIMUM PRISON TIME AND SUITABLE HOUSING IS NOT AVAILABLE, HE MUST BE TRANSFERRED TO A RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (RTF) (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD FOR THE PRIOR (2003) INJURY, THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD FOR THE CURRENT (2015) INJURY MUST BE REDUCED BY THE LOSS OF USE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIOR INJURY (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENSE IN THIS MURDER CASE WAS BASED ON THE LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE ASSAILANT, THE DEFENDANT WAS STILL ENTITLED TO A JUSTIFICATION-DEFENSE JURY-INSTRUCTION; THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE JUSTIFICATION-DEFENSE JURY CHARGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; IN ADDITION, THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED CVIL RIGHTS LAW 52 BY ALLOWING THE MEDIA TO RECORD TESTIMONIAL PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).
SORA Point Assessments Affirmed Over Two-Justice Dissent Arguing the Proof of Online Sexual Conduct Was Insufficient, the Evidence of “Grooming” the Victims Was Insufficient, and the Social Immaturity of the Defendant Should Have Been Considered as a Mitigating Factor
THE SOURCE CODE USED TO CONNECT DNA FROM THE MURDER SCENE TO THE DEFENDANT GENERATED A REPORT WHICH IMPLICATED THE DEFENDANT AND WAS THEREFORE TESTIMONIAL, HOWEVER, THE SOURCE CODE, AS A FORM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WAS NOT THE DECLARANT; THEREFORE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH THE SOURCE CODE DID NOT VIOLATE HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Real Property Purchased by Husband Prior to the Marriage Cannot Be Transformed... Deed Was Not a “Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure;” Deed Therefore Did...