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​ THE MAJORITY HELD THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH DISORDERLY CONDUCT AS A FAMILY OFFENSE, FINDING THE CONDUCT WAS NOT “PUBLIC;” THE DISSENT ARGUED THE CONDUCT WAS “PUBLIC” IN THAT IT TOOK PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF ADULTS AND CHILDREN OUTSIDE A DAYCARE CENTER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined the evidence did not establish a family offense (disorderly conduct): The majority and the dissenter disagreed on whether the conduct was “public” in nature:

“[C]ritical to a charge of disorderly conduct is a finding that [the mother’s] disruptive statements and behavior were of a public rather than an individual dimension . . ., which requires proof of an intent to threaten public safety, peace or order” … . “[A] person may be guilty of disorderly conduct only when the situation extends beyond the exchange between the individual disputants to a point where it becomes a potential or immediate public problem” … .

From the dissent:

[The] disruptive behavior outside a daycare program in the direct presence of other adults and children took on a public dimension that was no doubt alarming to the grandmother, the child and the bystanders. Whether intentional or not, such conduct satisfies the reckless component for the charge. On this record, the charge of disorderly conduct within the petition was established by a preponderance of the evidence and should have been sustained (see Penal Law § 240.20 [1], [3] …). Matter of Linda UU. v Dana VV., 2023 NY Slip Op 00013, Third Dept 1-5-22

Practice Point: In order for conduct to amount to disorderly conduct it must have a “public” as opposed to an “individual” dimension. This case shows the distinction can be difficult to discern.

 

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