Judge Effectively Rescinded the Initial Declaration of a Mistrial and Left the Decision Whether to Declare a Mistrial Up to the Defendant—Because the Defendant Ultimately Agreed to the Mistrial the Double Jeopardy Prohibition Was Not Triggered

The Court of Appeals determined that, although the trial judge initially declared a mistrial without defense counsel’s consent, the judge effectively rescinded the declaration by leaving it up to the defendant to decide whether a mistrial should be declared (defense counsel had objected to the way the judge was handling the trial).  Because the mistrial was ultimately agreed to by the defendant, a second trial was not precluded by the double jeopardy prohibition:

Until the jury is discharged, a court may rescind its previous declaration of mistrial (see People v Dawkins, 82 NY2d 226 [1993]). Defendant argues that in this case the trial judge never formally rescinded his initial mistrial ruling, and so whether or not she indicated her consent after that ruling is irrelevant. Certainly, the judge never expressly said “I rescind my order declaring a mistrial.” But we have never required any particular language to be used to retract a prior order. Here, the record makes clear that the trial judge was leaving the mistrial decision up to defendant. Because she decided to “go with a mistrial,” and thus consented to it, her double jeopardy claim fails. Matter of Gorman v Rice, 2014 NY Slip Op 07923, CtApp 11-18-14