You are here: / / In a Personal Injury Trial, Defense Counsel Should Have Been Permitted...
, ,

In a Personal Injury Trial, Defense Counsel Should Have Been Permitted to Question Plaintiff About Possible Fraud in Income Tax Returns

The Fourth Department determined defense counsel in a personal injury trial should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff about possible fraud in plaintiff’s income tax returns.  A new trial was ordered.  The Fourth Department noted that defense counsel would have been bound by plaintiff’s answers and could not have introduced extrinsic evidence:

Here, based on his reading of IRS Publication 51 and plaintiff’s federal tax returns, defendant’s attorney had a good faith basis to ask plaintiff about the propriety of her filing status. Moreover, if plaintiff had improperly filed federal tax returns as head of household in order to receive a tax credit to which she was not entitled, it raises the possibility that she may have committed tax fraud. We conclude that evidence that plaintiff may have committed tax fraud has “some tendency to show moral turpitude to be relevant on the credibility issue” …. Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiff’s answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refuting [those] answers by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]…), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the questions … . Young v Lacy, 2014 NY Slip Op 06417, 4th Dept 9-26-14

 

You might also like
Evidence Seized In Violation of Probationer’s Constitutional Rights Should Not Have Been Used as the Basis for a Probation Revocation
ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS VACATED BECAUSE IT WAS INDUCED BY THE JUDGE’S PROMISE THAT ALL THE COURT’S ORDERS COULD BE APPEALED; IN FACT, THE DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION THAT TWO COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT WERE DUPLICITOUS COULD NOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).
RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO DRIVER OF TOWN SNOWPLOW AND THE DRIVER DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS AWARE HER DOG COULD ATTACK ANOTHER DOG AND IT WAS FORESEEABLE A DOG OWNER WOULD TRY TO SEPARATE THE DOGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE DETECTIVE DID NOT READ THE MIRANDA RIGHTS TO DEFENDANT AND IT IS CLEAR FROM THE VIDEOTAPE THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT HAVE READ THE WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF THOSE RIGHTS BEFORE HE WAIVED THEM; THE PEOPLE, THEREFORE, DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED THE MIRANDA RIGHTS; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
NEGLECT FINDING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).
Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment Against Third-Party Defendant Under Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel
Whether the Insurer Is Obligated to Indemnify the Driver Turns on Whether the Driver Acted Intentionally When His Vehicle Struck the Rear of Decedent’s Vehicle—-There Was a Question of Fact Whether the Incident Was an Accident or the Result of Intentional Conduct

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Teacher’s Subpoena for School Records of a Student Who Testified at the... Provision in Separation Agreement Which Called for Employment of the Wife by...