You are here: / / In a Personal Injury Trial, Defense Counsel Should Have Been Permitted...
, ,

In a Personal Injury Trial, Defense Counsel Should Have Been Permitted to Question Plaintiff About Possible Fraud in Income Tax Returns

The Fourth Department determined defense counsel in a personal injury trial should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff about possible fraud in plaintiff’s income tax returns.  A new trial was ordered.  The Fourth Department noted that defense counsel would have been bound by plaintiff’s answers and could not have introduced extrinsic evidence:

Here, based on his reading of IRS Publication 51 and plaintiff’s federal tax returns, defendant’s attorney had a good faith basis to ask plaintiff about the propriety of her filing status. Moreover, if plaintiff had improperly filed federal tax returns as head of household in order to receive a tax credit to which she was not entitled, it raises the possibility that she may have committed tax fraud. We conclude that evidence that plaintiff may have committed tax fraud has “some tendency to show moral turpitude to be relevant on the credibility issue” …. Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiff’s answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refuting [those] answers by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]…), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the questions … . Young v Lacy, 2014 NY Slip Op 06417, 4th Dept 9-26-14

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS HANDCUFFED AND SITTING ON THE BACKSEAT OF A POLICE CAR WHEN HE WAS ASKED QUESTIONS, INCLUDING WHETHER HE HAD BEEN DRINKING, BY THE OFFICER WHO MADE THE TRAFFIC STOP, THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE IMPOSITION OF TWO CONSECUTIVE PERIODS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION WAS ILLEGAL (FOURTH DEPT).
Municipalities (Counties) Are Not “Persons” and Therefore Cannot Challenge a Statute on Due Process Grounds
Police Officer Struck by Plaintiffs’ Decedents When the Officer Was Making a U-Turn to Follow a Car Was Entitled to Summary Judgment Under the Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard
ALTHOUGH THE TWO THYROID SURGERIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE SAME DOCTOR, THE 2005 SURGERY AND THE 2010 SURGERY WERE DISCRETE EVENTS; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED BY THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT DOG OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT SHE HAD HEARD THAT ONE OF HER DOGS NIPPED A BOY IN A PRIOR INCIDENT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT; THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
PETITIONERS DID NOT TAKE STEPS TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO AND THE POWER PLANT BECAME OPERATIONAL AT THE OUTSET OF THE MOTION PRACTICE SEEKING TO VACATE CERTAIN PERMITS WHICH ALLOWED THE PLANT TO RESUME OPERATIONS, THE APPEAL WAS DEEMED MOOT AND THE PETITION WAS DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
Repugnant Verdict Required Reversal

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Teacher’s Subpoena for School Records of a Student Who Testified at the... Provision in Separation Agreement Which Called for Employment of the Wife by...