You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE TWO THYROID SURGERIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE SAME DOCTOR, THE...
, ,

ALTHOUGH THE TWO THYROID SURGERIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE SAME DOCTOR, THE 2005 SURGERY AND THE 2010 SURGERY WERE DISCRETE EVENTS; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED BY THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT).

image_pdfPDF Friendly Versionimage_printPrint Friendly Version

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice action based upon a 2005 thyroid surgery by the same doctor who performed the 2010 thyroid surgery was time-barred. The two surgeries were discrete events and the statute of limitations was not tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine:

Defendants established that [the 2005] claims are time-barred inasmuch as more than 2½ years elapsed between the date of the alleged conduct and the commencement of the action … , and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not treat with Dr. Chahfe in relation to the 2005 surgery after her final follow-up appointment in 2005, and that she did not return to Dr. Chahfe until 2010. The surgical procedures in 2005 and 2010 were ” discrete and complete’ events that cannot be linked by way of the continuous treatment doctrine” … , and there was no evidence of anticipated further treatment related to the 2005 procedure at the time plaintiff left Dr. Chahfe’s care in 2005 … . Angelhow v Chahfe, 2019 NY Slip Op 05437, Fourth Dept 7-5-19

 

/by
You might also like
Person Injured After Being Thrown from a Motorcycle Is an “Occupant” of the Motorcycle Within the Meaning of the Insurance Law and Is Therefore Not Eligible for First-Party No-Fault Benefits
Fall from Flatbed Truck Was Covered by Labor Law 240 (1)—Fall Caused by Gravity Acting On Plywood Being Hoisted from the Truck
The Private Right of Action Afforded to Patients in “Residential Health Care Facilities” Pursuant to Public Health Law 2801-d Does Not Apply to Residents of a Group Home for the Developmentally Disabled
TRIAL COURT DID NOT, AS PROMISED, INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE PURPOSES OF INTRODUCING HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THE CHILD-VICTIM’S DISCLOSURES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT; THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE ERROR WAS REVERSIBLE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S ONCOMING CAR WHEN DEFENDANT WAS FOUR CAR LENGTHS AWAY, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THE TRAFFIC LIGHT WAS YELLOW DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT)
Action Seeking to Enjoin Closure of Charter School Dismissed
PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION VACATING AN ORDER CONCERNING A COUNTERCLAIM WAS THE LAW OF THE CASE, NOT A PRIOR SUPREME COURT RULING ON THE COUNTERCLAIM, ACCOUNTANT REPORT PREPARED FOR LITIGATION NOT DISCOVERABLE (FOURTH DEPT).
COCAINE IS NOT DANGEROUS CONTRABAND WITHIN THE MEANING OF PROMOTING PRISON CONTRABAND IN THE FIRST DEGREE; CONVICTION REDUCED TO PROMOTING PRISON CONTRABAND IN THE SECOND DEGREE (PROHIBITING ‘CONTRABAND,’ AS OPPOSED TO ‘DANGEROUS CONTRABAND’) (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2020 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT... ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS AGAINST PETITIONER,...