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As a Matter of Discretion, the Court Can Grant a Separate Property Credit for Property Which Was Originally Separate But Which Was “Transmuted” into Marital Property (Overruling Precedent)—the Credit Was Properly Denied Here

The Third Department determined that, under the facts of the case, Supreme Court properly denied the wife a credit for the marital home which originally was her separate property.  The wife subsequently put the property in both her and her husband’s names and the property was used to consolidate the debts of both husband and wife.  However, the Third Department took the opportunity to explain that property which is originally separate but which is then “transmuted” to marital property can be the basis of a separate-property credit, overruling a case relied upon by Supreme Court to deny the credit.  The credit can be applied as a matter of discretion:

…[T]o the limited extent that Campfield [95 AD3d 1429] may be read to limit a court’s discretion to award a separate property credit to a spouse, like the wife, who transmutes separate property into marital property without changing the nature of the property itself, it should no longer be followed. As we have subsequently noted without reference to the way in which a marital asset was acquired, credits are often given for the value of the former separate property (see Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d at 1321). We have also subsequently explained that the decision to award a separate property origination credit in such a situation is a determination left to the sound discretion of Supreme Court (see Alecca v Alecca, 111 AD3d at 1128; Murray v Murray, 101 AD3d at 1321). Therefore, our own jurisprudence subsequent to Campfield indicates that such credit is not precluded as a matter of law when separate property has been transmuted into marital property. Myers v Myers, 2014 NY Slip Op 05228, 3rd Dept 7-10-14

 

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