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Criteria for Discovery from Non-Party Explained/Criteria for Discovery of Trade Secrets Explained

The Second Department explained the criteria for discovery demanded of a non-party [Morgan Stanley] and described the relevant considerations when discovery is opposed on the ground that the material requested constitutes trade secrets.  The court concluded Morgan Stanley had demonstrated certain of the discovery requests related to protected trade secrets:

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4), a party may obtain discovery from a nonparty in possession of material and necessary evidence, so long as the nonparty is apprised of the “circumstances or reasons” requiring disclosure. Pursuant to the Court of Appeals' recent decision in Matter of Kapon v Koch ( ____ NY3d ____, 2014 NY Slip Op 02327 [2014]), disclosure from a nonparty requires no more than a showing that the requested information is “material and necessary,” i.e. relevant to the prosecution or defense of an action (id., *1). However, “the subpoenaing party must first sufficiently state the circumstances or reasons' underlying the subpoena (either on the face of the subpoena itself or in a notice accompanying it), and the witness, in moving to quash, must establish either that the discovery sought is utterly irrelevant' to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious'” (id.). Should the nonparty witness meet this burden, “the subpoenaing party must then establish that the discovery sought is material and necessary' to the prosecution or defense of an action, i.e., that it is relevant” (id.). * * *

Notwithstanding New York's policy of liberal discovery (see id., * 4-5), a party seeking disclosure of trade secrets must show that such information is “indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way” … . A witness who objects to disclosure on the ground that the requested information constitutes a trade secret bears only a minimal initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a trade secret … . Contrary to [plaintiff's] contention, Morgan Stanley met its minimal initial burden of showing that the documents requested in paragraphs 11 through 19 in the section of the subpoena duces tecum entitled “Requests for Production” contained trade secrets … . Thus, the burden shifted to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that the information contained in those documents was indispensable to the ascertainment of truth, and could not be acquired in any other way … . Ferolito v Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 05153, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

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