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Constructive Trust Cause of Action Did Not Accrue When Defendant Acquired the Subject Property (In 1995 or 1996), But Rather When Defendant , Who Had Properly Acquired the Property, Breached Her Promise to Transfer an Interest in the Property to Plaintiff (In 2012)

In finding the constructive trust cause of action should not have been dismissed as time-barred, the Second Department explained that a cause of action for a constructive trust accrues (1) when the constructive trustee acquires the property wrongfully, or (2) when the constructive trustee wrongfully withholds property which was lawfully acquired but was to be transferred:

A cause of action “for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213(1), which starts to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution” … . “A determination of when the wrongful act triggering the running of the Statute of Limitations occurs depends upon whether the constructive trustee acquired the property wrongfully, in which case the property would be held adversely from the date of acquisition, or whether the constructive trustee wrongfully withholds property acquired lawfully from the beneficiary, in which case the property would be held adversely from the date the trustee breaches or repudiates the agreement to transfer the property” … .

Here, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust is not … that the defendants wrongfully acquired the subject properties in or around 1995, or 1996, but rather that subsequent thereto, sometime in 2012, the defendant… breached her promise to the plaintiff that they would be equal partners with respect to those properties … . Barone v Barone, 2015 NY Slip Op 06102, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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