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Complaint Stated Cause of Action for Legal Malpractice/Court Rejected Argument that Defect in Service Could Have Been Cured by Successor Counsel as Speculative

The Second Department determined the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for legal malpractice.  The court rejected the defendants’ argument that successor attorneys could have remedied the defect in service as speculative because, in order to remedy the defect, Supreme Court would have had to exercise discretion:

To establish a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant attorney failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed by a member of the legal community, (2) proximate cause, (3) damages, and (4) that the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying action had the attorney exercised due care … . To establish proximate cause, it must be demonstrated that a plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action but for the attorney’s negligence … .

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory … . Grant v La Trace, 2014 NY Slip Op 05155, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

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