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CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the conditional order requiring that a note of issue or motion be filed by plaintiff bank within ninety days did not meet the requirements of a notice pursuant to CPLR 3216. Therefore the administrative dismissal of the foreclosure action was invalid:

“CPLR 3216 permits a court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where certain conditions precedent have been complied with” … . As relevant here, an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) “unless a written demand is served upon the party against whom such relief is sought' in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him for unreasonably neglecting to proceed'” … . While a conditional order of dismissal may have “the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216” … , the conditional order here “was defective in that it failed to state that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice will serve as a basis for a motion' by the court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute” … . Moreover, the conditional order failed to satisfy the notice requirement on the additional ground that there was “no indication that the plaintiff's counsel was present at the status conference at which the court issued the conditional order of dismissal,” nor was there “evidence that the order was ever properly served upon the plaintiff” … . In the absence of proper notice, “the court was without power to dismiss the action for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the conditional order of dismissal” … . Lastly, the Supreme Court erred in administratively dismissing the action without further notice to the parties and without benefit of further judicial review … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bastelli, 2018 NY Slip Op 05822, Second Dept 8-22-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL FORECLOSURE, CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3216 (CONDITIONAL ORDER DID NOT MEET THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216, FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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