Supreme Court’s Finding Respondent Was No Longer Suffering from a Dangerous Mental Condition Reversed

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, over a partial dissent, determined Supreme Court erred in finding that the respondent no longer suffers from a dangerous mental condition and could be released from a secure psychiatric facility.  Respondent is now 74 years old and had stabbed a woman 20 years ago.  He refuses to take medication and he refused to undergo a psychiatric evaluation by the Office of Mental health. There were stark differences in the assessment of his mental condition presented at a hearing pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 330.20.  The experts arguing for continued retention were named Simon-Phelan and Formica:

Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03(20) defines a mental illness as “an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation” (Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03[20]).

Upon our review of the record, we find that the credible evidence established that the respondent suffers from a mental illness, the first element of a dangerous mental disorder (see CPL 330.20[1];[c]). Simon-Phelan and Formica opined that the respondent suffers from bipolar disorder, along with various personality disorders, whether narcissistic, grandiose, or antisocial. Most relevant, the respondent’s behaviors, consistently displayed over the past 20 years, as thoroughly documented throughout the record, are indicative of these disorders. These behaviors include his aggressive and violent acts, his abrasiveness when speaking to others, his refusal to follow rules, his inappropriate sexual advances, his inflated self-esteem, his high level of energy, his excessive writing, and his overzealousness with respect to litigation … . Although the categorization of the respondent’s mental illness has differed between mental health professionals, a number of professionals have drawn the same conclusions as Simon-Phelan and Formica, dating back as far as 1994. As one psychiatrist put it in 2003, the debate about whether the respondent’s “pathology is Axis I or Axis II or some combination thereof . . . can be carried on indefinitely,” but when one considers his symptomatic exacerbation, poor judgment, and poor impulse control, all of which continue to exist, he remains in “the category of dangerously mentally ill.” Matter of Marvin P, 2014 NY Slip Op 03690, 2nd Dept 5-21-14