You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE DOCTORS WHO TREATED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM WERE NOT...
, ,

ALTHOUGH THE DOCTORS WHO TREATED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM WERE NOT EMPLOYED BY THE HOSPITAL, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THEY HAD APPARENT OR OSTENSIBLE AGENCY RENDERING THE HOSPITAL VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR ANY MALPRACTICE COMMITTED BY THEM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant medical center (Peconic Bay) did not demonstrate it was not vicariously liable for any malpractice committed by  two doctors (Wackett and McMahon) who treated plaintiff in the emergency room. Although neither doctor was employed by Peconic Bay, there was a question of fact whether they had apparent or ostensible agency of Peconic Bay:

… [T]he medical malpractice cause of action asserted against Peconic Bay alleged that the plaintiff twice sought treatment in Peconic Bay’s emergency room and was treated by, among others, Wackett and McMahon. In moving for summary judgment, Peconic Bay established that neither Wackett nor McMahon was its employee. Nevertheless, the evidence submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment was insufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff entered Peconic Bay’s emergency room seeking treatment from Wackett or McMahon privately rather than from the hospital itself, and thus, that these physicians did not have apparent or ostensible agency of Peconic Bay … . Peconic Bay further failed to eliminate any triable issues of fact as to whether Wackett or McMahon was negligent in his care and treatment of the plaintiff … . Sessa v Peconic Bay Med. Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 07570, Second Depty 12-29-21

 

You might also like
Totality of the Evidence Established Accident Was “Staged”
IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS HAD DIED AT THE TIME THE ACTION AGAINST THEM WAS COMMENCED; THAT ACTION WAS A NULLITY; THEREFORE THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXECUTOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
REQUIREMENT THAT COVERAGE CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE GROUND FOR THE DENIAL IS SPECIFIED IN THE DISCLAIMER LETTER APPLIES ONLY TO DEATH AND BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, THE INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON A VANDALISM EXCLUSION IN THIS PROPERTY DAMAGE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF STANDING, WHICH IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL AND COULD NOT BE RAISED BY A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S EIGHT-YEAR-OLD SON WAS MORE THAN HALFWAY ACROSS THE STREET WHEN STRUCK (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Licensed Driver Properly Supervised Young Driver with a Learner’s Permit
CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS ABOUT FATHER’S ABUSE OF MOTHER SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE FROM A PRIOR NEGLECT PROCEEDING, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A PARTIAL VERDICT WITHOUT INTERVIEWING THE... DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT RAISED DISPUTED FACTS;...