Constitutionality of Statute Allowing Defective Sentence to Be Remedied by a Sentence Without Post Release Supervision (CPL 70.85) Is an Open Issue Which Should Be Decided by the Sentencing Court in the First Instance/Crawford Motion Relieving Counsel of Perfecting an Appeal Because of the Absence of Non-Frivolous Issues Should Not Have Been Granted
The Court of Appeals determined the Appellate Division should not have granted counsel’s motion to withdraw from representing the defendant on appeal on the ground the appeal would be “wholly frivolous.” There is an issue whether the statute which allows resentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment without post release supervision after post release supervision had been (illegally) administratively imposed is constitutional:
Defendant timely appealed the resentence and was assigned counsel, who reviewed the file and informed defendant of our decision in People v Boyd (12 NY3d 390 [2009]), where this court upheld defendant Boyd's sentence under Penal Law § 70.85, but left open the constitutionality of that statute, stating that it should be decided by the sentencing court in the first instance. Despite this open issue, counsel filed a motion pursuant to People v Crawford … arguing that there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on defendant's behalf and asking to be relieved as counsel. Defendant filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that her sentence was illegal, and that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division granted counsel's motion and affirmed the resentence, without addressing defendant's pro se contentions (96 AD3d 1515 [2012]). * * *
Defendant argues that her appeal was not wholly frivolous because she had two claims: (1) the claim that Penal Law § 70.85 is unconstitutional as applied to her case, and (2) that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at every level. We agree with defendant that the Appellate Division erred in granting the Crawford motion. Without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits, at the time defendant's appellate counsel filed his Crawford motion, the claims to that court were not wholly frivolous and, therefore, the court should have denied appellate counsel's motion. As a result, a reversal and remittal for a de novo appeal is warranted… . People v Beaty, 84, CtApp 1-16-14