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Post-Readiness Delay Ran Out Speedy Trial Clock

The Third Department determined defendant’s indictment must be dismissed because of the People’s post-readiness delay.  There were seven days left on the speedy trial clock when the People obtained a superseding indictment. The People requested an adjournment.  The record did not demonstrate the length of the requested adjournment, so the People were charged with the actual length of the adjournment, which was more than seven days:

…[W]here the People have requested an adjournment, “it is the People’s burden to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings at which the adjournment was actually granted is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the subsequent CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged” … .  The People failed to discharge that burden here.  The calendar call at which the adjournment was granted was not transcribed and, although the People are only chargeable with the length of the adjournment actually requested … – as opposed to the length of the adjournment ultimately granted – the record does not establish the length of the adjournment requested by the People. Accordingly, we have no choice but to charge the People with the entire 21 days occasioned by the adjournment, which brings them beyond the seven days remaining on the speedy trial clock… . People v Miller, 104500, 3rd Dept 1-9-14

 

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