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​ THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE TRAFFIC STOP, THE 40-MINUTE DETENTION, THE CALLING OF DEFENDANT’S PAROLE OFFICER, AND THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR BY THE PAROLE OFFICER, WERE VALID; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER DETENTION AROSE ONLY AFTER THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE LIMITED DETENTION BASED ON THE TRAFFIC STOP HAD DISSIPATED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the traffic stop for rolling through a stop sign and the extended 40-minute detention and the search of the vehicle were valid. The dissenters argued that rolling through the stop sign justified only a limited detention. The facts described by the majority are too detailed to fairly summarize. When the officers stopped the car, they were aware of defendant’s legal history and parole status. The defendant was outside the geographical limit of his parole conditions: The defendant’s parole officer was called to the scene and he conducted a search of the car pursuant to parole rules:

Defendant’s multiple and inconsistent explanations about his travels, which the police officers knew were false, coupled with his parole situation and his nervous demeanor throughout the encounter, combined to give the officers a founded suspicion of criminality … . As such, the police officers were authorized to extend the scope of the stop beyond its original justification by requesting consent to search defendant’s vehicle and, upon denial, detaining defendant to await a canine sniff of the vehicle’s exterior … . * * *

Given that defendant was placed on lifetime parole in 1999 due to illegal narcotics activity, we conclude that Pirozzolo’s [the parole officer’s] decision to search the vehicle was reasonable and substantially related to the performance of his duties … .

From the dissent:

Defendant did give conflicting answers in response to [officer] Linehan’s inquiry, and County Court found that such answers, coupled with defendant’s nervous demeanor and parole status, gave Linehan founded suspicion that criminality was afoot. These answers and behavior by defendant, however, came after the initial justification for stopping and detaining defendant had already dissipated … . Indeed, between the time when Linehan effectuated the traffic stop and processed defendant’s license and registration, Linehan did not observe anything suspicious by defendant so as to give him founded suspicion that criminality was afoot in order to continue defendant’s detention … . People v Thomas, 2022 NY Slip Op 07263, Third Dept 12-22-22

Practice Point: Here the majority concluded the traffic stop, the 40-minute detention, calling the defendant’s parole officer, and the search of the car by the parole officer, were valid. Two dissenters argued only the limited initial detention related to the traffic stop for rolling through a stop sign was justified.

 

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