You are here: / / Complaint Did Not State a Cause of Action Against City for Negligent Failure...
,

Complaint Did Not State a Cause of Action Against City for Negligent Failure to Provide Emergency Medical Services—No “Special Relationship” Alleged

The Second Department determined a complaint against the City alleging a negligent failure to provide emergency services (resulting in the death of plaintiff’s decedent) should have been dismissed.  The court explained that the criteria for a “special relationship” with the city with respect to responding to a call for medical help had not been met:

As a general rule, “a municipality may not be held liable to a person injured by the breach of a duty owed to the general public, such as a duty to provide police protection, fire protection or ambulance services” … . There is, however, a “narrow class of cases in which [the courts] have recognized an exception to this general rule and have upheld tort claims based upon a special relationship’ between the municipality and the claimant” … . Such special relationship imposes a specific duty upon the municipality to act on behalf of the claimant … . As articulated by the Court of Appeals in Cuffy v City of New York, “[t]he elements of this special relationship’ are: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking”… .

Here, the complaint fails to allege any facts tending to show that there was any “direct contact” between the decedent and the defendants or that there was any “justifiable reliance” on any promise made to the decedent by the defendants. Accordingly, the complaint does not state facts from which it could be found that there was a special relationship between the decedent and the defendants necessary to assert a negligence cause of action against the defendants … . In the absence of any allegation of such a relationship, the complaint cannot state a viable cause of action against the City based on its alleged negligence in failing to send an ambulance to the decedent’s home.  Freeman v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 07707, 2nd Dept 11-20-13

 

You might also like
ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT).
Defendant’s Admissions Re: Uncharged Sex Offenses Justified Upward Departure from the Presumptive Level—Criteria for Upward Departures Explained
THERE REMAINED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS CREATED THE ICY CONDITION AND WHETHER THEY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF STUDENT INJURED WHEN GYMNASIUM DOOR CLOSED ON HIS FINGER, INADEQUATE SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR TORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NOTICE OF CLAIM DID NOT INCLUDE ALLEGATION THAT THE DOOR WAS DEFECTIVE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED (1) THE PROTRUDING PIPE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS, (2) THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK, AND (3) THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION PROHIBITING THE ACCUMULATION OF DEBRIS DID NOT APPLY; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES OF OVER $34,000 IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPEALS IN THIS DIVORCE CASE; HOWEVER A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO APPORTION THE FEES BETWEEN THE PARENTS (SECOND DEPT).
APPELLANT PHYSICIAN’S ASSISTANT HAD LEFT DEFENDANT-PRACTICE AT THE TIME THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS BROUGHT AGAINST THE PRACTICE; THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE APPELLANT HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE SUIT; THEREFORE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DID NOT SUPPORT THE MOTION TO ADD THE APPELLANT AS A DEFENDANT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Cause of Action for Legal Malpractice Accrues When Malpractice Is Committed,... Question of Fact Re: Plaintiff’s Comparative Fault Precludes Summary Judgment—Supreme...