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Default for Failure to File Note of Issue Within 90 Days of Demand Properly Excused

In affirming Supreme Court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to file and note of issue after a 90-day demand, the Second Department noted the court’s discretion in this area:

Where, as here, a plaintiff has been served with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3), that plaintiff must comply with the demand by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, either to vacate the demand or to extend the 90-day period … . Here, the plaintiff failed to do either within the 90-day period. Therefore, in order to excuse his default, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for his failure to timely file the note of issue or move to either vacate the demand or extend the 90-day period, as well as a potentially meritorious cause of action … . The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the discretion of the motion court … .

Nevertheless, CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” …, in that it “never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … . Thus, “the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay, and potentially a meritorious cause of action” …, but depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff is not always required to establish both a justifiable excuse and a potentially meritorious cause of action to avoid such a dismissal … .

In this case, the plaintiff demonstrated that he did not intend to abandon the action and that there were ongoing discovery proceedings conducted during the time period involved. Belson v Dix Hills AC Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 05144, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

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