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Injury from Falling Piece of Concrete-Pour-Form Raised Question of Fact About Liability Under Labor Law 240 (1)

The Second Department affirmed the denial of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) claim. Plaintiff was removing wooden forms used to pour concrete. After removing one piece of a form, the piece above it fell and struck plaintiff. The Second Department explained:

Labor Law § 240(1) requires property owners and contractors to provide workers with “scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” to the workers (Labor Law § 240[1]). The purpose of the statute is to protect against “such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted or inadequately secured” .. . However, not every object that falls on a worker gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1) …. Thus, in order to recover damages for violation of the statute, the “plaintiff must show more than simply that an object fell causing injury to a worker” .. . A plaintiff must show that, at the time the object fell, it was “being hoisted or secured” … or “required securing for the purposes of the undertaking” … . The plaintiff must also show that the object fell “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute”… .  . The evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion did not establish “the absence of a causal nexus between the worker’s injury and a lack or failure of a device prescribed by section 240(1)”.. . Ross v DD 11th Ave LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 05686, 2nd Dept 8-21-13

 

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