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Malpractice Action for Depression-Treatment Prior to Suicide Is Actionable

The Second Department determined a cause of action for malpractice in treating plaintiff’s decedent for depression prior to her committing suicide should not have been dismissed:

Here, the complaint sought damages for conscious pain and suffering arising from Family Services’ alleged negligence in treating the decedent’s depression during the period between October 19, 2005, and the time of her death about 10 days later. That cause of action states a cognizable legal theory sounding in professional malpractice … .

Further, EPTL 11-3.2(b), referred to as the “survival statute” …, provides that “[n]o cause of action for injury to person . . . is lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed.” A cause of action based on personal injuries which survives the death of the decedent is distinct from a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death … . Accordingly, the cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering predicated on alleged acts of professional malpractice committed between October 19, 2005, and October 28, 2005, survived the decedent’s death, and damages for such pain and suffering may be recoverable by her estate … .  Stolarski v Family Servs of Westchester Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 06850, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

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