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Affidavit Supporting Motion to Strike Did Not Demonstrate Good Faith Effort to Resolve Issue with Opposing Counsel

In finding the defendant’s cross-claim should not have been struck as a sanction for failure to appear for depositions, the First Department noted that the affidavit in support of the motion to strike did not demonstrate a good faith effort to resolve the matter with opposing counsel:

A party moving to strike a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3126 is required to submit an affirmation that counsel for the moving party has made “a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion” with opposing party’s counsel (Uniform Rules for Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] 202.7). To be deemed sufficient, the affirmation must state the nature of the efforts made by the moving party to reconcile with opposing counsel (22 NYCRR 202.7[c]…).

Here, [defendant] GSY’s affirmation of its good faith effort to resolve the dispute with [cross-claim defendant] Shavolian did not substantively comply with the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.7 … . In its affirmation in support of the motion to strike, GSY stated that it made “good faith efforts to proceed with disclosure,” pointing to a letter it faxed to Shavolian’s counsel. There is nothing in the letter, which was written before the continued deposition date, indicating that GSY’s counsel actually conferred with Shavolian’s lawyer in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute… .  241 Fifth Ave Hotel LLC v GSY Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 06514, 1st Dept 10-8-13

 

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