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Plaintiff Should Have Been Allowed to Voluntarily Discontinue Lawsuit

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have permitted plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the lawsuit:

The court erred in declining to permit plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the action. CPLR 3217(b) authorizes a court to grant a motion for voluntary discontinuance “upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper.” While the determination upon such an application is generally within the sound discretion of the court …, a party ordinarily cannot be compelled to litigate and, absent special circumstances, such as prejudice to adverse parties, a discontinuance should be granted … . No special circumstances have been shown here, especially since the action is still in the early stages of litigation. Nor was there any showing that plaintiff sought the discontinuance only to avoid an adverse determination in this action ,,, . Since we are granting plaintiff’s motion, the cross motion to compel discovery must be denied.  Bank of Am NA v Douglas, 2013 NY Slip 06440, 1st Dept 10-3-13

 

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