You are here: / / Failure to Provide Personal Ropes to Firefighters Is a Proper Basis for...
, , , ,

Failure to Provide Personal Ropes to Firefighters Is a Proper Basis for a General Municipal Law 205-a Claim

The First Department determined the alleged violation of Labor Law 27-a(3)(a)(1)  was sufficient to support an action by firefighters against the City pursuant to General Municipal Law 205-a.  Firefighters were injured and killed jumping from a building without personal ropes. The failure to provide personal ropes is the basis of the suit.  Governmental immunity did not bar the suit:

The City unavailingly contends that Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1) cannot provide a valid predicate for any General Municipal Law § 205-a claim. However, the statute, known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), which imposes a general duty on an employer to provide employees with “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees” (Labor Law § 27-a[3][a][1]), is sufficient since it is ” a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties'” … .

Moreover, the City failed to “show that it did not negligently violate any relevant government provision or that, if it did, the violation did not directly or indirectly cause plaintiff’s injuries” … . There is evidence, including testimony and an investigative report, that the failure to issue personal ropes to the firefighters contributed to the injuries and deaths suffered when the firefighters jumped from windows using either no safety devices or a single rope that had been independently purchased by one of the firefighters. The City is also not entitled to dismissal of these claims pursuant to governmental function immunity, since the evidence concerning the removal of existing personal ropes in 2000, and the failure to provide new ropes in the period of more than four years from then until the fire giving rise to these claims, raises issues of fact concerning whether the absence of ropes “actually resulted from discretionary decision-making — i.e., the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results” … . Stolowski v 234 E 178th St LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 01732, 1st Dept 3-3-15

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPLACE OR DISMISS HIS STANDBY COUNSEL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
CLAIMANT FELL OFF AN I-BEAM AND HIS LANYARD DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM STRIKING THE DECK EIGHT TO TEN FEET BELOW; CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
GLOMAR RESPONSE, NEITHER CONFIRMING NOR DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF DOCUMENTS, APPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS.
WITH RESPECT TO A RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CAN BE SUED BY A SHAREHOLDER FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, BUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS NOT AMENABLE TO SUIT APART FROM A SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, WHICH WAS DEEMED BROADER IN SCOPE THAN THE STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HER SUPERVISOR SQUEEZED HER THIGH AND HER REJECTION OF THAT ADVANCE RESULTED IN HER BEING TREATED LESS WELL THAN OTHER EMPLOYEES THEREAFTER (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE CORRECT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, PETIT LARCENY IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ROBBERY THIRD, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, VACATE ITS DECISION AND REINSTATE A 2014 JUDGMENT WHERE NO REQUEST THAT COULD FORM THE BASIS OF THAT ACTION WAS MADE IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FIRST DEPT).
The “Strict Compliance” Rule Re: Documents Required for a Drawdown from a Letter of Credit Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Merger Doctrine and “As Is” Clause Did Not Bar Suit/Fraud-Based... Release Applied to Claims Unknown at the Time the Release Was Signed and to...