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Where Plaintiff’s Vehicle Repaired to Pre-Accident Condition, No Additional Recovery for Diminution in Resale Value

Plaintiff’s brand new Mercedes was damaged in an accident but was fully repaired, and the repairs were paid for by the defendants’ insurance carrier.  Plaintiff sought damages based upon the diminution in resale value resulting from the fact that potential buyers would be made aware of the car’s involvement in the accident.  The Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint explaining that diminution in resale value is not to be taken into account:

The defendants established that the plaintiff has no cause of action to recover the damages he seeks herein. “The measure of damages for injury to property resulting from negligence is the difference in the market value immediately before and immediately after the accident, or the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore it to its former condition, whichever is the lesser” … . “Where the repairs do not restore the property to its condition before the accident, the difference in market value immediately before the accident and after the repairs have been made may be added to the cost of repairs” … . However, where, as here, there is no dispute that the repairs fully restored the vehicle to its condition before the accident, and the only basis of the claim made by the plaintiff for the difference in value immediately before and immediately after the accident is not that his automobile could not be fully repaired, but, rather, that after repair the resale value would be diminished because the car had been in an accident, “the diminution in resale value is not to be taken into account” … . Parkoff v Stavsky, 2013 NY slip Op 05737, 2nd Dept 8-28-13

 

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