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THE PEOPLE’S “READY FOR TRIAL” STATEMENT, MADE BEFORE THE INDICTMENT WAS FILED, WAS CONCEDEDLY ILLUSORY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY-TRIAL GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the People conceded the statement of readiness for trial was illusory. Therefore defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds should have been granted:

“Ready for trial” for purposes of CPL 30.30 means “present readiness, not a prediction or expectation of future readiness” … . “A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock” … .

Here, as the People correctly concede, their statement of readiness filed on November 9, 2021, before the filing of the indictment, was illusory and thus ineffective to stop the speedy trial clock … . The People also acknowledge that they did not thereafter declare their readiness until after the six-month period had expired and, therefore, that the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial should have been granted … . People v Moore, 2024 NY Slip Op 06214, Second Dept 12-11-24

Practice Point: A “ready for trial” statement which is a prediction or an expectation of future readiness is illusory and invalid.

 

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