You are here: / / Overriding Village Legislative Cap on Number of Taxicab Licenses Not a...
,

Overriding Village Legislative Cap on Number of Taxicab Licenses Not a Proper Subject of Mandamus Action—Applicability of Mandamus Explained

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined the Article 78 proceeding which sought to override a legislative cap on the number of taxicab licenses which could be issued by the village was not a proper subject of a mandamus action:

“The extraordinary remedy of mandamus is available in limited circumstances only to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act which does not involve the exercise of official discretion or judgment, and only when a clear legal right to the relief has been demonstrated” .. . “A discretionary act involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result” … . Thus, mandamus may be employed “to compel acts that officials are duty-bound to perform” … . However, mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a purely legislative function … . “[T]he courts must be careful to avoid . . . the fashioning of orders or judgments that go beyond any mandatory directives of existing statutes and regulations and intrude upon the policy-making and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative and executive branches”… .  Matter of Gonzalez v Village of Port Chester, 2013 NY slip Op 05691, 2nd Dept 8-21-13

 

You might also like
TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR TO QUESTION DEFENDANT ABOUT THE FACTS UNDERLYING PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE SANDOVAL RULING, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
PROTECTIVE ORDER VACATED UPON EXPEDITED REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS “FALL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER” CASE (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE FAMILY COURT ACT AND PENAL LAW REQUIREMENTS IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PETITION DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
A CASH ACCOUNT AGREEMENT WHICH MEMORIALIZED A REVERSE MORTGAGE WAS NOT A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, THEREFORE THE HOLDER OF THE CASH ACCOUNT AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FORECLOSE (SECOND DEPT).
Defendant Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees after Plaintiff’s Motion for a Voluntary Discontinuance in a Foreclosure Action Was Granted Without Prejudice—Defendant Was Not a “Prevailing Party” within the Meaning of Real Property Law 282—Denial of Attorney’s Fees Was Not an Abuse of Discretion Under CPLR 3217 (c)
Wood Which Fell From a Shelf When Plaintiff Inadvertently Moved It Was the Condition for the Occurrence of the Event, But Not the Cause
BURDENS OF PROOF FOR MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE EXPLAINED; CRITERIA FOR RAISING AN ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL EXPLAINED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Defendant Denied Constitutional Right to Present a Defense—Evidence Victim... Fraud Sufficiently Pled; Six-Year Statute of Limitations Applied