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Writ of Prohibition Granted to Prevent Trial Judge from Precluding Testimony of Complainant—Complainant Would Not Release His Psychiatric Records

The First Department granted a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial judge from precluding the testimony of the complainant in a robbery case. The judge had precluded the testimony after the complainant refused to sign a HIPAA form to release his psychiatric records.  The complainant had acknowledged that he received psychiatric treatment and that he had auditory and visual hallucinations which were controlled by medication.  The First Department wrote:

An article 78 proceeding seeking relief in the nature of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is available to prevent a court from exceeding its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction … . “The writ does not lie as a means of seeking a collateral review of an error of law, no matter how egregious that error might be . . . but only where the very jurisdiction and power of the court are in issue” … . Here, the court had no authority to issue this preclusion order since the records were neither discoverable nor Brady material … . It is undisputed that the People did not have the complainant’s records and did not know where he had been treated … . The People had no affirmative duty to ascertain the extent of the complainant’s psychiatric history or obtain his records … . The People advised the defense of the information they had regarding the complainant’s diagnosis and also apprised the defense of the complainant’s statements regarding his hallucinations. Therefore, no claim can be made that the People concealed any information from the court or the defense.  Matter of Johnson v Sackett, 2013 NY Slip Op 05663, 1st Dept 8-20-13

 

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