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PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S RESIDENCE IS CALIFORNIA AND THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS RESIDENTIAL-MORTGAGE-BACKED-SECURITIES BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION THEREFORE ACCRUED IN CALIFORNIA; UNDER NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE, CPLR 202, THE ACTIONS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY ARE UNTIMELY UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a two-judge dissent, determined that California, the residence of the plaintiff, here a residential-mortgage-backed-securities trustee, was where the breach of contract action accrued, not New York. Therefore, pursuant to CPLR 202, New York’s borrowing statute, the action must be timely under both California and New York law. The action was not timely under California law which has a four-year statute for breach of contract:

Defendants argued that as a resident of California, plaintiff suffered economic injury in California, and therefore plaintiff’s causes of action accrued in California for the purposes of CPLR 202. Plaintiff conceded that it was a resident of California. It argued, however, that instead of applying the general rule that an economic injury is suffered where the plaintiff resides to determine where the cause of action accrued, the court should apply a multi-factor analysis. Plaintiff asserted that because it was suing in a representative capacity on behalf of the trusts, it did not suffer real economic loss, and its residence was irrelevant, or at least not the primary consideration, for determining the place of accrual. * * *

We reaffirm that “a cause of action accrues at the time and in the place of the injury” … . Although courts may, in appropriate cases, conclude that an economic loss was sustained in a place other than where the plaintiff resides, we decline to apply the multi-factor analysis that plaintiff proposes. * * *

… [W]e conclude that plaintiff’s residence applies to determine the place of injury in this case. As trustee, plaintiff is authorized to enforce, on behalf of the certificateholders, the representations and warranties in the relevant agreements. Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to look to plaintiff’s residence as the place where the economic injury was sustained and, consequently, where plaintiff’s causes of action accrued for purposes of CPLR 202. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Barclays Bank PLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 08519, Ct App 11-25-19

 

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