You are here: / / Out-Of-Possession Landlord Not Liable for Missing Light in Stairwell
,

Out-Of-Possession Landlord Not Liable for Missing Light in Stairwell

The Second Department determined the out-of-possession landlord could not be liable for a missing light in a stairwell, the alleged cause of plaintiff’s fall:

“An out-of-possession landlord’s duty to repair a dangerous condition on leased premises is imposed by statute or regulation, by contract, or by a course of conduct”… . Here, the defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it was an out-of-possession landlord, that it was not contractually obligated to maintain the lighting at the premises or repair the alleged hazardous condition, that it did not endeavor to perform such maintenance, and that it did not violate any relevant statute or regulation… . Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03969, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

SLIP AND FALL

 

You might also like
THE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WALKING THROUGH A LANDSCAPED AREA ADJACENT TO A PARKING LOT WAS INHERENT TO THE NATURE OF THE AREA AND THEREFORE NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).
SURVIVING PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT TIMELY MOVE TO SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DECEDENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 1021, ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER WAS INJURED CHANGING THE CARBON DIOXIDE CARTRIDGE FOR AN ANIMAL TRANQUILIZER GUN; THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE MANUFACTURER SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-E/LABOR LAW 27-A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
A COMPONENT OF A TOWER CRANE WAS BEING HOISTED WHEN IT SWUNG TO THE SIDE AND PINNED PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; THE REPORT THAT A SUSPICIOUS CAR WAS FOLLOWING SOMEONE DID NOT DESCRIBE THE CAR AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT FOLLOWING ANYONE WHEN STOPPED; THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS TRESPASSING BY DRIVING ON THE PRIVATE ROAD, WHICH WAS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP RELIED UPON BY SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM JAIL PURSUANT TO CPL 180.80 BUT WAS KEPT INCARCERATED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 2 1/2 MONTHS; PLAINTIFF’S FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
SEVEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Appreciation of Value of Marital Residence Should Have Been Reduced by Cost... Only Sellers’, Not Buyers’, Agent Can Be Liable for Failure to Disclose...