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Appreciation of Value of Marital Residence Should Have Been Reduced by Cost of Improvements

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have reduced the distributive award based upon the appreciation in value of the marital residence during the marriage by the equitable share of the marital debt incurred in making improvements to the residence:

While the marital residence was the plaintiff’s separate property, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of $102,500 as a distributive award based on the appreciation in value of the marital residence that was attributable to the efforts of both parties in physically improving the property during the marriage (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][3]…). Although the defendant’s counsel noted at trial that the defendant’s distributive award based on the appreciation of the marital residence should be reduced by the defendant’s equitable share of the marital debt incurred in financing the improvements to the residence, the Supreme Court improperly failed to do so… . Szewczuk v Szewczuk, 2013 NY Slip Op 03987, 2nd Dept, 6-5-13

 

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BANK’S PROOF OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT INSUFFICIENT AT BOTH THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL STAGES IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
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THE OPTION TO RENEW THE LEASE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE; IT WAS MERELY AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE (SECOND DEPT).
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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

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