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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION BY THE INSURED ABOUT A PRIOR BITE BY A DOG, AND WHETHER THERE ACTUALLY WAS A PRIOR BITE, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A CANINE POLICY EXCLUSION APPLIED AND WHETHER THERE WAS A TIMELY DISCLAIMER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the insured made a misrepresentation to the insurer and whether the insurer timely disclaimed coverage for a dog bite. There were questions of fact whether the insured was asked about a prior bite by the dog and gave a false answer, and whether there had actually been a prior bite by the dog which would trigger a policy exclusion:

“When construing Insurance Law § 3420 (d), which requires an insurer to issue a written disclaimer of coverage for death or bodily injuries arising out of accidents ‘as soon as is reasonably possible,’ [the Court of Appeals has] made clear that timeliness almost always presents a factual question, requiring an assessment of all relevant circumstances surrounding a particular disclaimer[, and] cases in which the reasonableness of an insurer’s delay may be decided as a matter of law are exceptional and present extreme circumstances” … . “The timeliness of an insurer’s disclaimer is measured from the point in time when the insurer first learns of the grounds for disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage” … . The insurer has an obligation not only to promptly provide notice of disclaimer once it has reached that decision, but to promptly investigate and reach a decision on whether to disclaim … . …

[The insurer] argues that it was entitled to rely on [the insured’s] statement that the dog had not previously bitten anyone. As noted above, there is a question of fact regarding whether [the insurer’s] claims manager actually asked [the insured] if she knew of any prior biting events. If the claims manager never asked that question, the record evidence presents a triable issue of fact as to whether [the insurer] failed to conduct a reasonable and prompt investigation into the potential applicability of the canine exclusion … . If the claims manager asked that question and received a negative answer, as she averred, then [the insurer] would be justified in relying on the representation by its insured … ; however, given that the [insured] had owned the dog for only approximately one month, there would still be a triable question of fact regarding the reasonableness of [the insured’s] investigation. As neither party established, as a matter of law, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the delay in [the insured’s  disclaimer, neither party was entitled to summary judgment … . Battisti v Broome Coop. Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 04992, Third Dept 7-5-18

​INSURANCE LAW (DOG BITES, QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION BY THE INSURED ABOUT A PRIOR BITE BY A DOG, AND WHETHER THERE ACTUALLY WAS A PRIOR BITE, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A CANINE POLICY EXCLUSION APPLIED AND WHETHER THERE WAS A TIMELY DISCLAIMER (THIRD DEPT))/ANIMAL LAW (DOG BITES, INSURANCE LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION BY THE INSURED ABOUT A PRIOR BITE BY A DOG, AND WHETHER THERE ACTUALLY WAS A PRIOR BITE, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A CANINE POLICY EXCLUSION APPLIED AND WHETHER THERE WAS A TIMELY DISCLAIMER (THIRD DEPT))/DISCLAIMERS (INSURANCE LAW, DOG BITES, QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION BY THE INSURED ABOUT A PRIOR BITE BY A DOG, AND WHETHER THERE ACTUALLY WAS A PRIOR BITE, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A CANINE POLICY EXCLUSION APPLIED AND WHETHER THERE WAS A TIMELY DISCLAIMER (THIRD DEPT))

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