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THE LIEN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT A TOWING COMPANY STORING A CAR PURSUANT TO A POLICE IMPOUND HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND A HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT BEFORE RELEASING THE CAR, THE CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED WHEN PETITIONER FIRST REQUESTED IT, IN ADDITION, THE $50 A DAY STORAGE FEE IS EXCESSIVE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined respondent towing company, which was storing petitioner’s car pursuant to a police impound, did not have the authority to demand police approval for release of the car or a hold harmless agreement, and the $50 a day storage fee was excessive. The car should have been released when petitioner first requested it:

On October 29, 2016, respondent All County Towing and Recovery (hereinafter respondent) towed a vehicle to its facility at the direction of a local police department. On November 2, 2016, respondent mailed a notice to the registered owner of the vehicle and petitioner, a lienholder, advising that the vehicle was in its possession as a result of a police impound, that a lien was being asserted pursuant to Lien Law § 184, that storage fees were accruing in the amount of $50 per day and that, once the vehicle was released from police impound, it could be retrieved “upon full payment of all charges accrued” as of the date of release. That same day, petitioner offered to pay the fees then due in order to take possession of the vehicle, but respondent refused to surrender the vehicle unless petitioner obtained a release authorization from the local police department. Petitioner’s agent again attempted to recover the vehicle on November 7, 2016, and reported that respondent now demanded, in addition to a police release, the execution of a hold-harmless agreement in its favor. …

… [W]e conclude that nothing in Lien Law § 184 authorized respondent to condition the release of a vehicle upon the provision of a release authorization from law enforcement officials or the execution of a hold-harmless agreement in its favor … . …

… [W]e agree with Supreme Court that respondent’s $50 daily storage fee is unreasonable … . Matter of Ally Fin., Inc v All County Towing & Recovery, 2018 NY Slip Op 08223, Third Dept 11-29-18

LIEN LAW (CAR STORAGE, THE LIEN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT A TOWING COMPANY STORING A CAR PURSUANT TO A POLICE IMPOUND HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND A HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT BEFORE RELEASING THE CAR, THE CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED WHEN PETITIONER FIRST REQUESTED IT, IN ADDITION, THE $50 A DAY STORAGE FEE IS EXCESSIVE (THIRD DEPT))/VEHICLE STORAGE (THE LIEN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT A TOWING COMPANY STORING A CAR PURSUANT TO A POLICE IMPOUND HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND A HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT BEFORE RELEASING THE CAR, THE CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED WHEN PETITIONER FIRST REQUESTED IT, IN ADDITION, THE $50 A DAY STORAGE FEE IS EXCESSIVE (THIRD DEPT))

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