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PETITIONER, A PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY AGENCY FOR DISABLED PERSONS, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO UNFETTERED ACCESS TO RECORDS OF ABUSE KEPT BY RESPONDENT JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS; THE PRIVACY INTERESTS OF THE DISABLED PERSONS REQUIRE THAT PERSONS FOR WHOM THE RECORDS ARE SOUGHT BE SPECFICALLY IDENTIFIED ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY OF THE GROUNDS FOR RELEASE OF THE RECORDS DESCRIBED IN THE FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT APPLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mackey, determined that the petitioner, a protection and advocacy (P & A) agency representing persons with developmental disabilities, did not have the right to unfettered access to records of abuse investigations by the respondent Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs. Before access to such records can be granted, the respondent must be provided with the name of the allegedly abused person. At that point the respondent can determine whether any of the grounds for release of the records is applicable:

Our inquiry here distills to whether petitioner is entitled — in executing its investigatory, oversight function as a P & A entity — to unqualified access to records pertaining to the abuse and/or neglect of persons with developmental disabilities within subject facilities, or whether respondents properly conditioned such access upon satisfaction of the disclosure requirements delineated under the DD Act [Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (see 42 USC § 15001 et seq.]. * * *

Satisfaction of the disclosure requirements under the DD Act thus necessitate the identification of the subject individual to either secure necessary consent or determine if circumstances otherwise permit disclosure. The result is “a carefully calibrated system that t[akes] into consideration both the privacy interests of developmentally disabled persons and the need for P & A organizations to examine records in order to pursue their statutory functions” … . Here, although petitioner’s request for records advised that it had received complaints regarding a particular facility subject to respondents’ oversight, it did not identify the subject(s) of the complaints or provide respondents any information that would allow respondents to determine whether one of the four circumstances enumerated in the DD Act applied. Nothing in the federal statutory language supports petitioner’s contention that it is permitted unqualified access to records in furtherance of its investigatory role. To the contrary, petitioner’s access is expressly conditioned upon satisfaction of one of the four above-detailed scenarios, which necessitate the identification of the individual(s) whose records are sought … . Matter of Disability Rights N.Y. v State Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs, 2026 NY Slip Op 01111, Third Dept 2-26-26

 

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