The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the dismissal of the sexual-behavior-related neglect allegations was error. The petition alleged masturbation in front of the child, having sex in front of the child, and showing pornography to the child. The 3rd Department concluded the allegations were sufficiently supported by the evidence. Matter of Chloe L. (Samantha L.), 2021 NY Slip Op 06892, Third Dept 12-9-21
The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined claimant actor was not an employee of the School of Visual Arts (SVA). Claimant was paid $10 an hour for a couple of acting jobs at SVA:
Claimant, a professional actor who maintained his own website and IMDb listing to showcase his acting experience and credentials, was referred for the two assignments at issue by an SVA faculty member. Claimant readily acknowledged that he only provided services for SVA once or twice a year, that he was free to provide similar services for other entities, that he could decline to participate in SVA projects for any reason, that he signed a written invoice proclaiming his status as an independent contractor and that no deductions were taken from his pay. Although claimant insisted, contrary to the testimony offered by SVA’s representative, that the scripts provided to him were not authored — and the scenes in which he appeared were not directed — by students, a closer reading of claimant’s testimony nonetheless reveals that the “direction” that he purportedly received from SVA faculty members was minimal and for the purpose of teaching students how to direct. In short, despite other possible indicia of an employment relationship, the record as a whole does not demonstrate that SVA exercised overall control over important aspects of the professional services offered by claimant … . Matter of Ewens (School of Visual Arts, LLC–Commissioner of Labor), 2021 NY Slip Op 06894, Third Dept 12-9-21
The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff police officer and defendant police were co-employees pursuant a Police Mutual Aid Agreement between two municipalities, the Town of Glenville and the Village of Scotia. Plaintiff, a Glenville police officer, alleged defendant , a Scotia police officer, was negligent in firing her weapon at a suspect, thereby causing a bullet to strike plaintiff. Because the plaintiff and defendant were deemed co-employees pursuant to the agreement, General Obligations Law 11-106 prohibited plaintiff from suing in negligence:
Pursuant to General Obligations Law § 11-106, a police officer may now assert a cause of action sounding in negligence “for injuries suffered while in the line of duty against entities other than municipal employers and fellow workers” … . The issue thus boils down to whether plaintiff and Peck [defendant] were acting as coemployees at the time of the incident, which would bar plaintiff’s action. Based primarily upon the operative provisions of the Agreement, we find that they were coemployees on the night of the incident, thereby insulating defendants from liability. Ferretti v Village of Scotia, 2021 NY Slip Op 06895, Third Dept 12-9-21
The Third Department confirmed the finding that petitioner cursed at and threatened a correction officer. The concurrence noted that a body camera would have would provided crucial evidence in a case like this:
Although we can accept the explanation here that the correction officer had not been assigned a body camera on the day of the incident, the perplexing question that remains is why not? A recording of actual events would certainly assist in resolving credibility disputes such as the one at hand, either exonerating or condemning the actions of the facility’s employees … . We are mindful that the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision has taken steps since 2018 to implement a body camera pilot program and that legislation has been introduced in the State Assembly and Senate to amend the Correction Law to require respondent to establish a “[b]ody camera for correction officers pilot program” at maximum security facilities … . As is evident from this case, it appears that a comprehensive body camera program has yet to be established. Matter of Pine v Annucci, 2021 NY Slip Op 06903, Third Dept 12-9-21
The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined a hearing was required before allowing the children to be vaccinated against COVID. The attorney for the children (AFC) and father, reflecting the wishes of the children, asked for court-approval for vaccination. Mother objected to vaccinating the children:
Family Court gave the parties notice that it was considering the AFC’s request and directed the parties to submit their positions to the court in writing, thus providing some limited opportunity to be heard. Having reviewed those submissions, the court rendered its decision. The court made specific findings that the subject children “have been fully informed regarding COVID-19 and the vaccine” and that they “have the capacity to consent.” These factual findings were made without evidence and based solely on hearsay, through unsworn letters containing representations by counsel. This does not constitute a sufficient basis to support these findings.
Considering that providing a vaccine constitutes medical treatment, and given the general preference toward conducting a hearing in this type of situation, we find that a hearing was required before Family Court could grant petitioner’s request over respondent’s objection … . At such a hearing, the court must focus on whether respondent’s refusal to authorize vaccination constitutes “an acceptable course of medical treatment for [her] child[ren] in light of all the surrounding circumstances,” while heeding the Court of Appeals’ cautionary point that courts cannot “assume the role of a surrogate parent” … . As the Office of Children and Family Services’ guidance documents prohibit local agencies from administering a COVID-19 vaccine if the child refuses to consent, the hearing must address whether the subject children have been fully informed about COVID-19 and the vaccine and whether they have the capacity to consent. After the hearing, the court must carefully balance the risks and benefits of the potential vaccination to decide whether to authorize it for the subject children … . Matter of Athena Y. (Ashleigh Z.), 2021 NY Slip Op 06908, Third Dept 12-9-21
The Third Department determined petitioner, a probationary employee of the Department of Public Works (DPW), was terminated based solely upon her gender and was properly reinstated with back pay:
Despite receiving two interim probationary reports that indicated her performance was satisfactory during the course of her employment, on April 3, 2018, petitioner was called to a meeting with respondent Daniel Crandell, DPW’s Commissioner, at which she was terminated after being told that she was “just not a good fit.” Although petitioner received a written termination letter at the close of that meeting, petitioner received no prior warning or notice of any problematic conduct. Notably, petitioner was the only female employee of DPW that was in a position of manual labor at the time of her termination. * * *
“Judicial review of the discharge of a probationary employee is limited to whether the determination was made in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason” … . * * *
Supreme Court found that, “[i]n the absence of any credible evidence that her work performance provided a basis for her termination, [it was] compelled to find that the only reason she was terminated was because of her gender.” Significantly, the court found respondents’ assertions regarding “[p]etitioner’s alleged argumentative attitude” to “reflect more of a post-termination justification for her dismissal than a valid or proper basis for the termination of her employment.” … [R]espondents failed to meet their burden of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for petitioner’s termination … . Matter of Triumpho v County of Schoharie, 2021 NY Slip Op 06727, Third Dept 12-2-21
The Third Department determined that double hearsay supported the denial of petitioner’s application to have a report maintained by the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment amended to be unfounded and expunged:
… [O]ur review of the record confirms that the double hearsay evidence introduced at the expungement hearing was sufficiently relevant and probative to the inquiries of whether petitioner drove under the influence of alcohol with the children in the car and whether she failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the children with proper supervision and guardianship by misusing alcohol to the extent of losing control of her actions … . Specifically, statements made to the investigating caseworker by the oldest and middle children, which were memorialized in the indicated report, supported the conclusion that petitioner drove under the influence of alcohol with the children in the car on at least two occasions in May 2019. Such statements were corroborated by petitioner’s admissions that, after roughly five years of sobriety, she relapsed in or around mid-May and that she “had a buzz” while driving the children. Further, the oldest child reported to the caseworker that, on the evening of May 29, 2019, she observed petitioner to be intoxicated, “sick” and “throwing up,” which prompted her to call her maternal grandparents. The oldest child’s account was corroborated by the maternal grandfather, who stated that he believed petitioner to have been intoxicated on the night in question and that it was “an ongoing concern.” Matter of Elizabeth W. v Broome County Dept. of Social Servs., 2021 NY Slip Op 06732, Third Dept 12-2-21
The Third Department determined that, because the debt was never accelerated, recovery of the installments due during the six years prior to commencement of the action is not time-barred:
The claim alleges that the [defendants] stopped making monthly payments as required by the 1988 agreement in December 2003, 15 years before the commencement of this action. “Without acceleration of the entire debt by” [plaintiff], however, “a cause of action for portions of the indebtedness” owed would only accrue when each of the individual installments became due … . The … defendants did not demonstrate that [plaintiff] accelerated the debt and, as a result, failed to sustain their burden of showing that the claim was time-barred to the extent that it sought to recover installments that became due after December 2012. DiCenzo v Mone, 2021 NY Slip Op 06734, Third Dept 12-2-21
The Third Department determined the possession of contraband determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner was seen smoking a cigarette. When he was asked what was in the cigarette, he answered “weed.” A test was performed which identified the substance as marihuana and petitioner was charged with possession of drugs and possession of contraband. The drug possession determination was dismissed when an inconsistency in the drug testing instructions was discovered. But the contraband possession determination remained and the punishment was unchanged:
Substantial evidence does not support the determination of guilt and, therefore, we annul. “[T]he prohibition of contraband hinges on whether or not the item is authorized” … . In light of the unreliable drug test and the absence of any hearing testimony identifying the substance at issue or attesting to petitioner’s alleged admission, the substance was not adequately identified … . Accordingly, “substantial evidence does not support the determination that the substance was unauthorized and, therefore, contraband” … . Matter of Razor v Venettozzi, 2021 NY Slip Op 06740, Third Dept 12-2-21
The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch which addresses several issues not summarized here, determined the bid in foreclosure proceedings pursuant to UCC 9-611 was too low:
Taking the position that the business cessation constituted a breach of the security agreement, [plaintiff] terminated the agreement and gave [defendants] notice of its intent to foreclose on the collateral — i.e., the outstanding medical receivables — by holding a public auction pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (see UCC 9-611). [Plaintiff] was the only bidder at the public auction and purchased the collateral by way of a $50,000 credit bid, which it then credited against the outstanding balance of the loan. * * *
We find that the credit bid was “significantly below” what a commercially reasonable bid should have been under the standard set forth in UCC 9-615 (f) (2) … . It follows that Supreme Court erred in awarding plaintiff damages for breach of contract. Specifin Mgt. LLC v Elhadidy, 2021 NY Slip Op 06578, Third Dept 11-24-21
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