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THE FACT THAT THE LADDER SLID OR SHIFTED AND FELL WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action in this ladder-fall case. Plaintiff alleged the ladder slid or shifted and then fell. In that circumstance plaintiff does not have to demonstrate the ladder was defective and any comparative negligence on plaintiff’s part should not be considered:

Defendants argue that the statutory requirement was not met because plaintiff testified that there was no defect in the extension ladder and that it felt secure. Although defendants have produced evidence that the ladder may not have been defective, the adequacy of the ladder is not a question of fact when it “slips or otherwise fails to perform its function of supporting the worker” … . …

Although defendants cite to numerous actions on the part of plaintiff in support of this contention, including that plaintiff did not (1) use an alternative safety device or scaffold to install the guidewires, (2) have supervision or ask for assistance when using the ladder or (3) clear the snow upon which the feet of the ladder were placed, these arguments merely raise a question as to plaintiff’s comparative negligence, which will not relieve defendants from liability … . Begeal v Jackson, 2021 NY Slip Op 05000, Third Dept 9-16-21

 

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IN THIS ELECTION LAW CASE, THE SIGNATORIES’ NAMES WERE PRINTED ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION BUT WERE INSCRIBED ON THE VOTER REGISTRATION FORMS; SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ACCEPTED PROOF THAT THE SIGNATORIES WHOSE NAMES WERE PRINTED WERE IN FACT THE SAME AS THOSE WHOSE SIGNATURES WERE ON THE REGISTRATION FORMS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly received evidence that signatories whose names were printed on the independent nominating petition were in fact the same as those whose signatures were inscribed on the voter registration forms:

It is well settled that [t]o prevent fraud and allow for a meaningful comparison of signatures when challenged, a signature on a designating petition should be made in the same manner as on that signatory’s registration form” … . Nevertheless, where there is “credible evidence from the signatories or from any of the subscribing witnesses attesting to the fact that the individuals who signed the registration forms were the same individuals whose signatures appeared on the independent nominating petition,” the signatures are valid, notwithstanding a discrepancy with the voter registration forms … . Here, respondents submitted affidavits from 21 of the 47 signatories with printed signatures in which they attested that they were the same individuals whose signatures appeared on the independent nominating petition. Based on those affidavits, which the court properly received in evidence, we conclude that the court did not err in determining that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to the invalidity of those 21 signatures … . Matter of Maclay v Dipasquale, 2021 NY Slip Op 05013, Fourth Dept 9-16-21

 

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HUSBAND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HIS WIFE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED HIM TO MARRY HER TO OBTAIN UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP; THE MARRIAGE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the husband did not demonstrate he was fraudulently induced to marry his wife. Husband argued his wife, who was from the Philippines, induced him to marry her in order to become a United States citizen. Supreme Court annulled the marriage. The Third Department held the husband did not meet his burden of proof:

Where the consent of either spouse to a marriage was obtained by fraud, the marriage is voidable by way of an annulment action (see Domestic Relations Law §§ 7 [4]; 140 [e] … ). To obtain an annulment, the plaintiff spouse must prove that the defendant spouse knowingly made a material false representation to the plaintiff spouse with the intent of inducing the plaintiff spouse’s consent to marriage, that the misrepresentation was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, that the plaintiff spouse justifiably relied on the misrepresentation in consenting to marriage and that, once aware of the false representation, cohabitation ceased … . …

The husband’s case of fraud in the inducement was premised upon his claim that the wife induced him to marry through false representations of love and affection for the sole purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. The husband, however, failed to prove that claim at trial, as his proof fell far short of demonstrating a fraudulent premarital intent on the part of the wife. The husband’s proof primarily consisted of testimony establishing premarital and marital discord between the parties. Although the husband sought to attribute that discord to a fraudulent premarital intent, he ultimately failed to demonstrate “that the marital break was due to any cause other than the general discontent and incompatibility of the parties” … . Indeed, the husband’s own proof demonstrated that, during their marital spats, the wife indicated her desire to leave the marriage and return to her family and friends in the Philippines. The fact that she remained in the United States after the parties ceased cohabitating is insufficient to demonstrate that, prior to the marriage, the wife had the intent to induce the husband to marry with the sole objective of obtaining an immigration benefit. In determining otherwise, Supreme Court erred by not holding the husband to his burden of proof, relying too heavily upon the wife’s belated filing of a family offense petition in another county and taking a negative inference against the wife for purportedly exploring relief under the Violence Against Women Act. Travis A. v Vilma B., 2021 NY Slip Op 04996, Third Dept 9-16-21

 

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THE FINDING BY THE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS WAS NEVER FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE GENERAL CITY LAW; THEREFORE THE 60-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR CONTESTING THE RULING NEVER STARTED TO RUN (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the 60-day statute of limitation for contesting a ruling of the board of zoning appeals (BZA) never started to run because the ZBA’s finding was never filed:

General City Law § 81-a (5) (a) imposes an affirmative duty on administrative officials charged with the enforcement of a local zoning law or ordinance in mandating that “[e]ach order, requirement, decision, interpretation or determination . . . shall be filed. . . within five business days from the day it is rendered, and shall be a public record” … . General City Law § 81-a (5) (b) states that “[a]n appeal shall be taken within [60] days after the filingof any order, requirement, decision, interpretation or determination of the administrative official, by filing with such administrative official and with the board of appeals a notice of appeal, specifying the grounds thereof and the relief sought” (… see Code of the City of Ithaca § 325-40 [B] [1] [e]). Upon review of the record, it is impossible to ascertain exactly when the Planning Board determined that variances were not necessary. However, it is undisputed that no determination of such finding was ever filed. As General City Law § 81-a (5) (b) plainly provides that the time period for commencing a review proceeding is to be measured from the filing, and there was no filing, the time period for the administrative appeal never began to run … . Matter of Grout v Visum Dev. Group LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04997, Third Dept 9-16-21

 

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GARAGEKEEPER’S LIEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that the garagekeeper’s lien action was properly declared null and void under the doctrine of laches. The respondent did not start the Lien Law action for six months, during which storage charges of $55-a-day were accruing:

“A garagekeeper’s lien is authorized by Lien Law § 184 (1) and the purpose of this statute is to provide the repair shop with security for the labor and material it expends which enhance the value of the vehicle” … . “The statute is in derogation of common law and thus is strictly construed” … . “Laches is defined as an equitable bar, based on a lengthy neglect or omission to assert a right and the resulting prejudice to an adverse party” … . We are unpersuaded by respondent’s claim that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case as the claim is purely statutory and does not lie in equity. Petitioner, by posting a $15,000 bond as collateral for respondent’s claim, has attempted in good faith to discharge the lien. We note that this action to enforce the lien is equitable, not legal, in nature … . … [I]t is clear from the record that petitioner was unaware of the existence of the lien until more than six months after storage charges began to accrue, and it was prejudiced by respondent’s assertion of such claim after such a prolonged period of delay. “It is well settled that where neglect in promptly asserting a claim for relief causes prejudice to one’s adversary, such neglect operates as a bar to a remedy and is a basis for asserting the defense of laches” … . Matter of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v Steve Jayz Automotive Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 04998, Third Dept 9-16-21

 

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THE RECORD WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE APPEAL OF THE SORA RISK LEVEL CLASSIFICATION; MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined the appeal of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk level classification could not be heard because the record was not sufficient. The matter was remitted:

“Although the short form order utilized by County Court contains the ordered language required to constitute an appealable paper, the written order fails to set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Correction Law § 168-n (3)” … . “The hearing transcript is similarly deficient as it does not contain clear and detailed oral findings to support County Court’s risk level classification” … . The scant record before us is not sufficiently developed to enable this Court to make its own factual findings and legal conclusions — particularly with respect to the number of victims and the points assessed under risk factor three. Accordingly, County Court’s order is reversed, and this matter is remitted for further proceedings. People v Kwiatkowski, 2021 NY Slip Op 04934, Third Dept 9-2-21

 

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THE EVIDENCE OF ALTERCATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CHILDREN AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION DID NOT SUPPORT THE NEGLECT FINDINGS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the neglect findings were not supported by the record:

With respect to the April 2018 incident, petitioner did not sufficiently demonstrate the presence of the children during the altercation that occurred. Given that “a finding of imminent danger is contingent on the child[ren] being present,” the evidence relating to that incident was not relevant and was insufficient to support a finding of neglect … .With respect to the January 2019 incident, it is undisputed that all of the children except the oldest child were asleep during the altercation; as such, the evidence presented could not support a finding of neglect as to the younger children. As to the oldest child, it is true that “a single act of domestic violence may be sufficient to establish neglect if the child is present for such violence and is visibly upset and frightened by it” … . However, the proof at the fact-finding hearing failed in this regard because it was not established that the oldest child was visibly upset or frightened. Thus, petitioner failed to demonstrate that the oldest child was in imminent risk of emotional or physical impairment … . Moreover, the oldest child’s out-of-court statements that the father gave her two to three shots of alcohol were not corroborated by the other evidence presented by petitioner, and the mere “repetition of an accusation by a child does not corroborate that child’s prior account” … . To the contrary, even petitioner’s witnesses conceded that such a level of alcohol consumption was not supported by their observations of the oldest child’s demeanor and her .01 blood alcohol content. With respect to the allegations of alcohol abuse while caring for the children, “[t]here was insufficient evidence that [respondents] ‘misused alcoholic beverages to the extent that [they] lost self-control of [their] actions,’ or that the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the children had been impaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired” … . Matter of Josiah P. (Peggy P.), 2021 NY Slip Op 04936, Third Dept 9-2-21

 

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE ITS OWN DETERMINATION TO APPORTION SOME OF CLAIMANT’S DISABILITY TO A 1976 INJURY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Worker’s Compensation Board, determined the Board did not have sufficient evidence to determine the extent to which a 1976 injury accounted for some of claimant’s disability:

We recognize that the Board’s medical guidelines “provide ‘useful criteria’ and the Board makes the ultimate determination of a claimant’s degree of disability, but that determination must be supported by substantial evidence” … . Moreover, “although the Board may reject medical evidence as incredible or insufficient, it may not fashion its own medical opinion” … . Here, there are no operative or pathological reports from any surgeries related to the 1976 injury in the record. Nor is there any medical evidence regarding the degree of disability, if any, that had resulted from the 1976 injury and/or surgery and the record reflects that claimant was fully employed with no restrictions at the time of the 2016 injury. Further, even assuming, without deciding, that an evaluation of the 1976 injury under the 1996 guidelines is appropriate for the purposes of determining whether that injury would have resulted in an SLU [schedule loss of use] award, there is no medical opinion that the 1976 injury would have resulted in an SLU award at the time of the injury or under the subsequently published 1996 guidelines. Matter of Hughes v Mid Hudson Psychiatric Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 04939, Third Dep 9-2-21

 

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SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ANNULLED THE ELECTION BOARD’S DESIGNATION OF AN EARLY VOTING POLLING PLACE BECAUSE THE BOARD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LOCATION MET THE ELECTION LAW REQUIREMENTS MANDATING A LOCATION ACCESSIBLE TO CITY RESIDENTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined Supreme Court properly annulled the determination of the Rensselaer County Board of Elections designating an early voting polling pace pursuant to Election Law section 8-600. The 3rd Department also granted the motion to intervene in the Article 78 proceeding brought by the NAACP and three minority and/or disabled residents who argued for a polling place accessible to city residents dependent on public transportation:

… [I]n designating early voting polling places, the Board “shall have at least one polling place” in the City (as Rensselaer County’s most populous municipality) and, because the City has public transportation, “such polling place shall be situated along such transportation routes” (Election Law § 8-600 [2] [a]). Election Law § 8-600 (2) (e) further states that any early voting polling place “shall be located so that voters in the county have adequate and equitable access, taking into consideration population density, travel time to the polling place, proximity to other early voting poll sites, public transportation routes, commuter traffic patterns and such other factors the board of elections deems appropriate” (see 9 NYCRR 6211.1 [c]). * * *

… [W]e conclude that the Board did not adequately address “whether the early voting site[s are] on or near public transportation” (9 NYCRR 6211.1 [c] [2] [iv]). The failure to address that mandatory factor “precludes meaningful review of the rationality of” the Board’s siting determination, renders the decision arbitrary and capricious and, by itself, warrants annulment … . The Board failed to meaningfully address most of the other factors as well. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted the petition and annulled the Board’s determination designating early voting polling places for the 2021 election … . Matter of People of the State of New York v Schofield, 2021 NY Slip Op 04785, Third Dept 8-26-21

 

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR SERVICE OF THE PETITION TO INVALIDATE A CERTIFICATE OF NOMINATION RAN OUT ON JULY 12; THE FACT THAT THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ORDERED SERVICE BY JULY 19 DID NOT EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEYOND JULY 12 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the petition to invalidate a certificate of nomination was properly dismissed as untimely. The fact that the order to show cause directing service of the petition by a date which was beyond the statute of limitation was of no consequence:

… Election Law § 16-102 (2) provides … that “[a] proceeding with respect to a primary, convention, meeting of a party committee, or caucus shall be instituted within [10] days after the holding of such primary or convention or the filing of the certificate of nominations made at such caucus or meeting of a party committee.” A special proceeding, in turn, is commenced by the filing of a petition … . Notably, “[a] petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2). In order to properly complete service, actual delivery must occur no later than the last day upon which the proceeding may be commenced” … . As the certificate of nomination … was filed on July 2, 2021, the last day upon which to commence this proceeding was July 12, 2021.

Even accepting as true that the petition was timely filed on July 12, 2021, the fact remains … that none of the named respondents was served with the petition prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. To the extent that petitioners rely upon the service provisions embodied in the order to show cause, which permitted service by various means on or before July 19, 2021, such reliance is misplaced. A court cannot extend the time within which to commence an action or proceeding (see CPLR 201 ,,,). Matter of Facteau v Clinton County Bd. of Elections, 2021 NY Slip Op 04743, Third Dept 8-18-21

 

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