You are here: / Third Department

Tag Archive for: Third Department

JUDGE IMPOSED RESTITUTION AT SENTENCING WHICH WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, SENTENCE VACATED.

The Third Department vacated defendant’s sentence because restitution was imposed but was not part of the plea agreement. Defendant should have been given the opportunity to withdraw his plea:

 

Inasmuch as the record fails to establish that payment of restitution was part of defendant’s plea agreement, we must agree that County Court erred in imposing the enhanced sentence without giving defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea … . Accordingly, defendant’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted to County Court to either impose the agreed-upon sentence or give defendant the option of withdrawing his plea before imposing the enhanced sentence … . People v Brasmeister, 2016 NY Slip Op 01019, 3rd Dept 2-11-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (IMPOSING RESTITUTION AT SENTENCING WHICH WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE)/RESTITUTION (IMPOSING RESTITUTION AT SENTENCING WHICH WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE)/SENTENCING  (IMPOSING RESTITUTION AT SENTENCING WHICH WAS NOT PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE)

DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD ON APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER DRUG LAW REFORM ACT, DENIAL OF APPLICATION ON THE PAPERS REVERSED.

The Third Department determined denial of defendant’s application for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act without allowing defendant to be heard was error:

 

The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 requires that, upon receipt of an application for resentencing, “the court shall offer an opportunity for a hearing and bring the applicant before it” (L 2004, ch 73, § 23; see CPL 440.46 [3]…). Inasmuch as the record does not reflect that defendant was afforded “an opportunity to be heard on the merits of [his] application,” the order appealed from must be reversed and the matter remitted to County Court so that a new determination can be made on defendant’s application after the proper procedure has been followed … . People v Davis, 2016 NY Slip Op 01006, 3rd Dept 2-11-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER DRUG LAW REFORM ACT REVERSED, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD)/DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER DRUG LAW REFORM ACT REVERSED, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD)/SENTENCING (DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER DRUG LAW REFORM ACT REVERSED, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD)

,

POLICE DISCIPLINE PROPERLY CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, DESPITE STATUTORY PROVISION PLACING DISCIPLINE IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMISSIONER.

The Third Department determined that a provision of the Second Class Cities Law specifically allowed the statute to be superseded by subsequent statutes. The Second Class City Law placed police discipline in the hands of the commissioner.  However a subsequently enacted provision of the Civil Services Law (called the Taylor Law) required police discipline to be the subject of a collective bargaining agreement, absent conflicting legislation. The Taylor Law prevailed because of the “planned obsolescence” of the Second Class City Law statute:

 

… [T]he Taylor Law mandates that disciplinary procedures for all public employees be the subject of good faith collective bargaining … . “[Courts] have long recognized the ‘strong and sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law'” … . Indeed, “the presumption is that all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining” … . However, because of the “competing policy . . . favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of police forces[, w]here legislation specifically commits police discipline to the discretion of local officials,” the policy favoring collective bargaining will give way to the legislatively established disciplinary procedures … . * * *

… [T]he clear and unambiguous language of Second Class Cities Law § 4 provides the best evidence that the Legislature intended to allow any or all of the provisions of the Second Class Cities Law to be supplanted by later laws applicable to the same subject matter … . Accordingly, we conclude that Second Class Cities Law article 9 does not require “that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way” … . Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 00729, 3rd Dept 2-4-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE DISCIPLINE CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NOT CONFLICTING STATUTE)/UNIONS (POLICE DISCIPLINE CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NOT CONFLICTING STATUTE)/STATUTES (PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE OF STATUTE ALLOWED IT TO BE SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTE)

CLAIMANT PROPERLY COMPENSATED FOR WORK-RELATED STRESS.

The Third Department determined claimant was properly awarded workers’ compensation benefits for work-related stress. The employer argued the stress was related to warning letters about claimant’s performance, which would not be compensable. One of the warning letters was deemed not to have been issued in good faith. And claimant submitted proof her stress-related symptoms appeared before the warning letters were issued. Claimant was a licensed clinical social worker who had been attacked by a client:

 

Workers’ Compensation Law § 2 (7) precludes claims for mental injuries based upon work-related stress “if such mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good faith by the employer.” “Whether the employer’s actions constituted a lawful personnel decision undertaken in good faith is a factual issue to be resolved by the Board”  … . * * *

“According deference to the Board’s resolution of witness credibility issues” … , and in light of the evidence that claimant suffers from a mental injury stemming from work-related stress and that she was being treated for the condition prior to the issuance of the warning letters, the Board’s determination that the claim was not barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 2 (7) is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed … . Further, based upon the foregoing, we find that the Board’s determination that the stress that caused claimant’s injury was greater than that of other similarly situated workers also is supported by substantial evidence … . Matter of Haynes (Catholic Charities), 2016 NY Slip Op 00560, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (AWARD FOR WORK-RELATED STRESS PROPER)/STRESS, WORK-RELATED (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PROPERLY AWARDED)

,

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXPERIENCE RATINGS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO NEW BUSINESS ENTITIES DOING THE SAME WORK, EMPLOYING SOME OF THE SAME PEOPLE, AND OPERATING FROM THE SAME ADDRESS.

The Third Department determined that the unemployment insurance experience ratings of businesses which had ceased operation and then reopened under new names were properly transferred to the new businesses:

 

Labor Law § 581 (7) (a) (1) states that “[i]f an employer transfers its organization, trade or business, or a portion thereof, to another employer and, at the time of the transfer, there is at least a ten percent common ownership, management or control of the two employers, then the unemployment experience attributable to the transferred organization, trade or business shall be transferred to the employer to whom such organization, trade or business is so transferred,” and “[f]or purposes of this subdivision ‘organization, trade or business’ shall include the employer’s workforce.” Matter of Prod. Processing Inc. (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 00565, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (EXPERIENCE RATINGS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO NEW BUSINESS ENTITIES)/LABOR LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE RATINGS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO NEW BUSINESS ENTITIES)

CONSULTANT HIRED TO EVALUATE TEACHERS WAS AN EMPLOYEE.

The Third Department determined claimant was an employee of RMC, an educational research firm which contracted with the NYC Department of Education. Pursuant to a “consultancy agreement,” claimant was hired to evaluate teachers who had been given unsatisfactory ratings:

 

… [C]laimant was required as part of RMC’s hiring process to submit an application, undergo an interview and provide references. Once hired and after signing the consultant agreement, he received six hours of training, was paid a hourly rate set by RMC, was expected to work three to four hours per week for a total of 36 weeks during the 10-week assignment and submitted a voucher provided by RMC on the 15th of each month to receive payment for hours worked. Notably, claimant was paid for services rendered regardless of whether RMC received payment from the client. Moreover, RMC’s name appeared at the top of the documents that claimant was required to prepare and it determined their format. Furthermore, during the course of his assignment, claimant interacted with RMC’s project director who reviewed his observation reports for comprehensiveness, clarity, spelling and grammar. Any complaints about claimant’s performance or that of the other peer observers were directed to RMC, and it arranged for a replacement if an assignment could not be completed. Matter of Strauss (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 00561, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CONSULTED HIRED TO EVALUATE TEACHERS WAS AN EMPLOYEE)

PART-TIME AEROBICS INSTRUCTOR WAS AN EMPLOYEE.

The Third Department determined a part-time aerobics instructor at a fitness club (Synchronicity) was an employee entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

 

Here, the evidence in the record reflects that Synchronicity established the fees that members of its fitness club were required to pay for their membership and claimant’s aerobics classes. Members would pay those fees to Synchronicity directly; claimant never collected money from any of the club’s members or charged them for attending her aerobics classes. While there is evidence that claimant’s rate of pay was negotiated, the record also reflects that all instructors at the fitness club were paid the same amount and were directly paid by check from Synchronicity once a week. While claimant would bring some of her own fitness equipment for her classes, including music and Pilates equipment, Synchronicity also provided her with an instruction room and made certain fitness equipment available to her, such as steps and free weights. Further, claimant was not allowed to solicit members of the club to attend classes that she offered at other fitness clubs. Matter of Raynor (Commissioner of Labor) 2016 NY Slip Op 00558, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (PART-TIME AEROBICS INSTRUCTOR WAS AN EMPLOYEE)

LANDLORD ACCEPTED TENANT’S SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES BY OPERATION OF LAW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Third Department, affirming Supreme Court, found plaintiffs-landlord had accepted defendant-tenant’s surrender of the premises by operation of law. The tenant, upon sufficient notice to the landlord, had moved most of its operation to a new location but continued to pay rent. The landlord then rented parts of the premises to two new tenants and changed the locks so defendant could not access the premises. At that point the tenant stopped paying rent and the landlord sued for the rent for the remaining portion of the lease. The court explained the elements of “surrender by operation of law:”

 

“A surrender by operation of law occurs when the parties to a lease both do some act so inconsistent with the landlord-tenant relationship that it indicates their intent to deem the lease terminated” … . A surrender by operation of law is inferred from the conduct of the parties, namely, the tenant’s abandonment of the demised premises and the landlord’s acceptance thereof; whether a surrender by operation of law has occurred in a particular case is generally a factual determination … .

Here, defendant established that plaintiffs relet parts of the premises without notice to defendant and refused to provide defendant with a key to the remaining premises, after having changed the locks. Plaintiffs also placed all the utility accounts in their own names. Plaintiffs’ assertion that a question of fact was raised as to whether there was construction in the leased premises precluding defendant’s use is unavailing. By their own account, plaintiffs refused to provide defendant with new keys and access to the “area in question” due to “ongoing construction” and liability concerns. Whether or not plaintiffs were simply replacing a generator outside the leased premises does not alter their refusal to allow defendant access to the premises. Nor do we overlook the fact that, in their complaint, plaintiffs seek to recover the full rent payable under the lease, without offset for rent received from the two new tenants … . Fragomeni v Aim Servs., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 00563, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

 

LANDLORD-TENANT (SURRENDER BY OPERATION OF LAW)/SURRENDER BY OPERATION OF LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT)

,

ACTION SEEKING RESCISSION OF A CONSERVATION EASEMENT RESTRICTING DEVELOPMENT ON UPSTATE LAND WITHIN THE NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED PROPERLY DISMISSED; UNIQUE LAW RE: MODIFICATION OR EXTINGUISHMENT OF A CONSERVATION EASEMENT EXPLAINED.

In an action seeking rescission of a conservation easement which restricts development on upstate land within the watershed for New York City, the Third Department affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and explained the unique law which pertains to the modification or extinguishment of a conservation easement:

 

“Conservation easements are of a character wholly distinct from the easements traditionally recognized at common law and are excepted from many of the defenses that would defeat a common-law easement” (… see ECL 49-0305 [2], [5]…). Pursuant to ECL 49-0307 (1), “[a] conservation easement held by a not-for-profit conservation organization may only be modified or extinguished” (1) pursuant to the terms of the instrument creating the easement, (2) in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL 1951, or (3) by eminent domain. Notably, ECL 49-0307 provides the exclusive means by which a conservation easement may be modified or extinguished (see ECL 49-0305 [2]). Argyle Farm & Props., LLC v Watershed Agric. Council of the N.Y. City Watersheds, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 00559, 3rd Dept 1-28-16

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (CONSERVATION EASEMENT, UNIQUE LAW APPLICABLE TO MODIFICATION OR EXTINGUISHMENT)/EASEMENTS (CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, UNIQUE LAW APPLICABLE TO MODIFICATION OR EXTINGUISHMENT)/CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (MODIFICATION OR EXTINGUISHMENT)

THE INSTALLATION OF LIGHT FIXTURES ON A PARTY WALL EXCEEDED ANY EASEMENT THAT MIGHT ARISE FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTY WALL.

A wall separating plaintiff’s (NYCAR’s) and defendant’s property was located entirely on NYCAR’s property. Defendant installed light fixtures on the wall for commercial purposes (an outdoor eating area for defendant’s restaurant). The defendant also installed a door in the wall to act as an emergency exit for patrons of the restaurant. Defendant argued the wall was a party wall and the easement which accompanies a party wall allowed the installation of fixtures on the wall. The Third Department explained that the installation of fixtures on the wall exceeded any easement which might exist:

 

Defendant concedes that the survey that plaintiff submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment shows that the wall lies wholly on NYSARC’s property, but argues that defendant’s installation of the fixtures and utilities was nevertheless proper because it is a party wall. “‘A party wall is generally described as a wall erected between two adjoining pieces of property and used for the common advantage of both owners'” … . Party walls are often located on the boundary line between parcels, in which case the portion of the wall on each property belongs to that parcel’s owner, subject to an easement in the other building’s owner for its support … . A party wall, however, may also “belong[] entirely to one of the adjoining owners, but [be] subject to an easement or right in the other to have it maintained as a dividing wall between the two tenements” … .

Here, defendant’s actions were beyond the scope of a party wall easement; the fixtures and utilities that defendant placed on the exposed eastern portion of the wall neither provided support to defendant’s building nor contributed in any way to the maintenance of a dividing wall between the buildings. Instead, they were installed solely for defendant’s “mere convenience or advantage” in operating its restaurant … . Stamp v 301 Franklin St. Café, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 00410, 3rd Dept. 1-21-16

 

REAL PROPERTY (PARTY WALL, EASEMENT EXCEEDED BY INSTALLATION OF LIGHT FIXTURES ON THE WALL)/PARTY WALL (EASEMENT EXCEEDED BY INSTALLATION OF LIGHT FIXTURES ON THE WALL)/EASEMENTS (EASEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH A PARTY WALL WAS EXCEEDED BY THE INSTALLATION OF LIGHT FIXTURES ON THE WALL)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy