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CRITERIA FOR INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE.

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the trial judge did not use the right criteria in denying defendant’s request to represent himself:

County Court inquired into defendant’s background, emphasized the importance of having counsel represent him, cautioned against the dangers of representing himself and tested defendant’s skill as an advocate with several evidentiary questions. The issue, however, is not the extent of defendant’s legal knowledge, but his capacity to knowingly waive the right to counsel … . In denying the request, County Court essentially ruled that it was not in defendant’s best interest and that the application was untimely, without expressly addressing defendant’s capacity to waive his right to counsel. Since defendant’s request was made prior to the commencement of trial, it was unquestionably timely … . Moreover, we are satisfied that defendant, who informed the court that he had obtained his GED and engaged in paralegal studies for a year, and was described by the court as “bright” and “articulate,” competently, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to the counsel. People v Poulos, 2016 NY Slip Op 07879, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

CRIMINAL LAW (CRITERIA FOR INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, CRITERIA FOR INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE)/PRO SE CRIMINAL LAW, CRITERIA FOR INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRITERIA FOR INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE)

CLAIMANT PRECLUDED FROM FURTHER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR FAILURE TO SEEK PERMISSION BEFORE SETTLING A RELATED TORT ACTION, MEANING OF THIRD PARTY ACTION IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED.

The Third Department determined claimant did not seek permission from her Workers’ Compensation carrier before settling another action which arose from the some of the same allegations as her Workers’ Compensation claim. Therefore she was precluded from receiving future Workers’ Compensation benefits. Claimant unsuccessfully argued that the federal court action which settled was not a “third party” action within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law because the action was against claimant’s co-worker and employer, not a “third party:”

“Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) requires either the carrier’s consent or a compromise order from the court in which the third-party action is pending for a claimant to settle a third-party action and continue receiving compensation benefits” … . Claimant urges that her federal lawsuit was not a third-party action since the statute addresses “the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [1]) and the associate dean who harassed her had the same employer as her. The Court of Appeals, however, has recently reiterated that Workers’ Compensation Law § 29, “‘read in its entirety and in context, clearly reveals a legislative design to provide for reimbursement of the compensation carrier whenever a recovery is obtained in tort for the same injury that was a predicate for the payment of compensation benefits'” … . “The Court reasoned that “‘[i]t would be unreasonable to read the statute as mandating a different result merely because the recovery came out of the pockets of a coemployee [or the employer] and not from the resources of a stranger'” … . Matter of Shiner v SUNY At Buffalo, 2016 NY Slip Op 07738, 3rd Dept 11-17-16

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CLAIMANT PRECLUDED FROM FURTHER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR FAILURE TO SEEK PERMISSION BEFORE SETTLING A RELATED TORT ACTION, MEANING OF THIRD PARTY ACTION IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED)

EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF BENEFITS.

The Third Department determined claimant’s excessive absenteeism justified the denial of unemployment insurance benefits. The fact claimant didn’t realize the last warning was a final warning did not excuse the behavior:

Excessive absenteeism, which continues despite repeated warnings, has been held to constitute misconduct disqualifying a claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits … . Here, it is undisputed that claimant was continually absent from work even after she was warned that further absences would result in disciplinary action, including discharge. Although claimant maintains that she did not realize that the last warning was her final one, this does not excuse her behavior under the circumstances presented. Matter of Mead (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 07374, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF BENEFITS)/ABSENTEEISM (EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF BENEFITS)

DISSATISFACTION WITH JOB ASSIGNMENTS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR RESIGNING.

The Third Department upheld the board’s finding claimant did not demonstrate good cause to leave her job and therefore was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits:

… [D]issatisfaction with job assignments or responsibilities has been held to not constitute good cause for resigning … . The Board credited the testimony of claimant’s supervisor regarding the reorganization and its effect upon claimant. Claimant’s title, grade, salary, work schedule and location were not being changed and, while there were changes in her job duties, her precise duties had not been finally determined due to the ongoing and preliminary nature of the reorganization.

Significantly, claimant did not attempt to speak with any of her supervisors before resigning to raise concerns or clarify the new job duties. The Board was free to reject claimant’s disputed testimony that she resigned as a result of ongoing retaliation … . Matter of Flint-Jones (Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 07368, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (DISSATISFACTION WITH JOB ASSIGNMENTS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR RESIGNING)

CLAIMANT’S CONNECTION TO A CORPORATION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT FINDING HE WAS NOT TOTALLY UNEMPLOYED.

The Third Department determined claimant, who was listed as a principal of a corporation (Reel One), did not have a sufficient connection to the corporation to warrant the board’s decision claimant was not totally unemployed:

It is well settled that “[a] claimant who is a principal of an ongoing corporation will not be considered totally unemployed if he or she stands to benefit financially from its continued operation, no matter how minimal the activities performed on its behalf” … .

Here, there is no evidence that claimant performed any activities, however trivial, on behalf of Reel One in 2010 during the time period at issue. In addition, there is no evidence that claimant’s name appeared on any bank accounts or corporate documents. Claimant testified that his wife created Reel One as a nonprofit corporation in the 1990s before they were married and that she was the sole shareholder. Although claimant and his wife, who both had extensive journalism experience, were listed as principals of Reel One on its website, claimant testified that his wife provided this information for marketing purposes only and that the website functioned as a type of advertisement. There is no evidence that the website was actively used to transact business. Matter of Petrick (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 07363, 3rd Dept. 11-10-16

 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CLAIMANT’S CONNECTION TO A CORPORATION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT FINDING HE WAS NOT TOTALLY UNEMPLOYED)

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ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

The Third Department determined all “rezoned” property-owners, deemed “necessary parties” by Supreme Court in this action to annul a local law rezoning property for industrial use. were, in fact, not “necessary parties.” The petition, which had been dismissed for failure to timely serve the newly-added “necessary parties,” was reinstated. The local law, which would allow a recycling center in a previously residential-agricultural zone, was challenged based upon an alleged failure to comply with the State Environment Quality Review Act:

The newly-added respondents were not necessary parties merely because the ordinance at issue affected their property rights. “‘[T]he absence of a necessary party may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, by any party or by the court on its own motion'” (Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Sulyman, 130 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2015], quoting Matter of Estate of Prospect v New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 13 AD3d 699, 700 [2004]). Given a court’s power to raise the issue, it is notable that the Court of Appeals and this state’s appellate courts, including this Court, have long entertained challenges to municipalities’ legislative actions in regard to zoning ordinances without requiring the joinder of every property owner whose rights are affected by the ordinance at issue … . ]). This has been true even when the ordinance at issue is one that, on its face, is likely to dramatically affect the property rights held by real property owners (see e.g. Matter of Wallach v Town of Dryden, 23 NY3d 728, 740 [2014]). Although this Court has, in limited cases, found property owners to be necessary parties in regard to legal challenges to municipal ordinances that affect the property owners’ rights, it has only done so in cases where the owners had obtained an actual approval pursuant to the challenged zoning ordinance that would be adversely impacted by a judgment annulling that ordinance … . Matter of Hudson Riv. Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v Town Bd. of The Town of Coeymans, 2016 NY Slip Op 07358, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ZONING (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALL PROPERTY OWNERS AFFECTED BY A CHALLENGED ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THE ACTION, ORIGINAL PETITION, WHICH DID NOT NAME ALL AFFECTED PARTIES, ALLOWED TO PROCEED)

HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED.

The Third Department concluded the nature of the confidential information provided to the hearing officer and the hearing officer’s failure to adequately inquire into the reliability of the information required annulment of the determination:

Here, the confidential information considered by the Hearing Officer consisted of, among other things, memoranda prepared by correction officials that briefly summarized their interviews with three confidential sources who stated, in conclusory fashion, that petitioner was the individual who broke the window. In addition, a memorandum and photo array identification were provided by one of the confidential sources, but were similarly lacking in detail. The Hearing Officer also considered the confidential testimony of the two correction officials who spoke directly with the confidential sources. The officials related that the sources identified petitioner as the individual who broke the window, but did not reveal any specific information regarding the basis of their knowledge. Significantly, there is no indication that the sources actually witnessed petitioner break the window nor any explanation as to how they acquired this information. In addition, the correction officials who interviewed them did not provide any endorsement of their reliability other than to state that they freely provided the information and were not coerced. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Hearing Officer failed to undertake the requisite independent assessment of the confidential information to establish its reliability … . Matter of Belliard v New York State Dept. of Corr., 2016 NY Slip Op 07382, 3rd Dept 11-10-16

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED)/EVIDENCE (INMATE DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, DETERMINATION ANNULLED)

NONWORKING CLAIMANT SUBJECT TO THE 75% CAP ON WAGE-EARNING CAPACITY IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO NO LESS THAN 25% LOSS OF WAGE- EARNING CAPACITY FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE DURATION OF BENEFITS; HERE A 15% LOSS OF WAGE-EARNING CAPACITY UPHELD.

The Third Department rejected the argument by the permanently disabled claimant that, because of a conflict between two applicable statutes, she could not be deemed to have sustained anything less than a 25% loss of wage-earning capacity. The Third Department determined the two statutory provisions were not in conflict and the evidence supported a 15% loss of wage-earning capacity:

Claimant argues that, because Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (5-a) limited her wage-earning capacity as a nonworking claimant to no more than 75% of her “former full time actual earnings,” the Board was statutorily prohibited from determining that she had less than a 25% loss of wage-earning capacity under Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w). She asserts that Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w) (xi) and (xii) are in conflict with Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (5-a) and that, to reconcile this perceived conflict, we should construe these provisions as applying only to claimants who are employed at the time of classification — i.e., those claimants who are not subject to the 75% restriction imposed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (5-a). * * *

As relevant here, in cases of permanent partial disability that are not amenable to schedule awards, “wage-earning capacity” is used to determine a claimant’s weekly rate of compensation. Specifically, in such cases, a claimant’s rate of compensation is two thirds of the difference between his or her average weekly wage and his or her wage-earning capacity (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3] [w]). Where a claimant is unemployed, wage-earning capacity is fixed by the Board — subject to a 75% cap (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [5-a]). In contrast, “loss of wage-earning capacity,” a term that was added in 2007 as part of a comprehensive reform of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see L 2007, ch 6, § 4), is used at the time of classification to set the maximum number of weeks over which a claimant with a permanent partial disability is entitled to receive benefits (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3] [w]). For instance, where, as here, a claimant is found to have sustained a 15% loss of wage-earning capacity, he or she is entitled to receive benefits for 225 weeks (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3] [w] [xii]). Matter of Till v Apex Rehabilitation, 2016 NY Slip Op 07247, 3rd Dept 11-3-16

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (NONWORKING CLAIMANT SUBJECT TO THE 75% CAP ON WAGE-EARNING CAPACITY IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO NO LESS THAN 25% LOSS OF WAGE- EARNING CAPACITY FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE DURATION OF BENEFITS)

VOCATIONAL FACTORS PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN SETTING COMPENSTATION FOR PERMANENTLY DISABLED LABORER.

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly took into account the claimant’s “vocational factors,” i.e., limited education, language barrier, work history, when setting the appropriate compensation. Claimant suffered a permanent partial disability and had been employed as a landscaper:

Here, … claimant suffered a permanent partial disability, there is no expectation that he will ever return to his former or similar employment as a laborer, and the Board necessarily considered vocational factors when it established his loss of wage-earning capacity. Because the evidence established that claimant did not earn actual wages, the statute authorized the Board to “[fix] in the interest of justice . . . such wage[-]earning capacity as shall be reasonable . . . having due regard to the nature of his injury and his physical impairment” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [5-a]). … [W]e find that the [statute’s] broad discretionary language authorized the Board to consider vocational factors that reflected claimant’s true ability to secure employment, particularly in the absence of evidence to negate claimant’s testimony that his injury contributed to his loss of wage-earning capacity … . Consequently, under the circumstances presented, we perceive no error in the Board’s determination to fix claimant’s wage-earning capacity based on the undisputed evidence of his physical disability and loss of wage-earning capacity resulting from his functional limitations and vocational impediments … . Matter of Rosales v Eugene J. Felice Landscaping, 2016 NY Slip Op 07239, 2nd Dept 11-3-16

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (VOCATIONAL FACTORS PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN SETTING COMPENSTATION FOR PERMANENTLY DISABLED LABORER)

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ACCEPTING A VERDICT BEFORE REQUESTED TESTIMONY WAS READ BACK TO THE JURY WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.

The Third Department determined any error associated with a jury-request for a readback of testimony not a mode of proceedings error and was unpreserved for review. Before the requested testimony was readback, the jury indicated it had reached a verdict. The verdict was accepted without the readback taking place:

The court read the note from the jury verbatim and announced its intention to permit a readback of the requested testimony one witness at a time, to which defense counsel did not object. In explaining the procedure to the jury, the court stated, “once you’ve heard the first readback . . . it might answer your questions” and explained that the jury could return to deliberations while the court reporter prepared additional testimony for readback, to which defense counsel did not object. After the readback of the relevant portions of one witness’s testimony, and presumably while the court reporter was preparing additional testimony for readback, the jury informed the court that it had reached a verdict. As defendant concedes, no mode of proceedings error occurred … , and, thus, defendant’s failure to lodge any complaint to any of the steps that the court took to respond to the request renders the issue unpreserved for our review … . Moreover, defendant’s current contention that the court should not have allowed the jury to reach a verdict until the entire readback had been completed is unavailing. By informing the court that it had reached a verdict prior to the completion of the readback, the jury unambiguously indicated that it was no longer in need of previously requested information … . People v Robtoy, 2016 NY Slip Op 07232, 3rd Dept 11-3-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ACCEPTING A VERDICT BEFORE REQUESTED TESTIMONY WAS READ BACK TO THE JURY WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND WAS UNPRESERVED FOR REVIEW)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, ACCEPTING A VERDICT BEFORE REQUESTED TESTIMONY WAS READ BACK TO THE JURY WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND WAS UNPRESERVED FOR REVIEW)

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