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COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ALCOHOL-MONITORING BRACELET.

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined County Court did not have the statutory authority to require defendant to pay for a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring (SCRAM) bracelet. Therefore revoking defendant’s probation and imposing a prison sentence based on defendant’s failure to make payments was error:

… [W]e are compelled to find “that County Court did not have statutory authority for requiring [defendant] to pay for the cost of the electronic monitoring program” … . While County Court can require a defendant to submit to the use of an electronic monitoring device if it determines that such a condition would advance public safety (see Penal Law § 65.10 [4]), it could not require a defendant to pay the costs associated with such monitoring since such costs do not fall within the category of restitution, but are more in the nature of a law enforcement expense … . People v Hakes, 2016 NY Slip Op 06905, 3rd Dept 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ALCOHOL-MONITORING BRACELET)/SCRAM BRACELET (COUNTY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ALCOHOL-MONITORING BRACELET)

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