You are here: / SPEEDY TRIAL

Tag Archive for: SPEEDY TRIAL

Post-Readiness Delay Ran Out Speedy Trial Clock

The Third Department determined defendant’s indictment must be dismissed because of the People’s post-readiness delay.  There were seven days left on the speedy trial clock when the People obtained a superseding indictment. The People requested an adjournment.  The record did not demonstrate the length of the requested adjournment, so the People were charged with the actual length of the adjournment, which was more than seven days:

…[W]here the People have requested an adjournment, “it is the People’s burden to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings at which the adjournment was actually granted is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the subsequent CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged” … .  The People failed to discharge that burden here.  The calendar call at which the adjournment was granted was not transcribed and, although the People are only chargeable with the length of the adjournment actually requested … – as opposed to the length of the adjournment ultimately granted – the record does not establish the length of the adjournment requested by the People. Accordingly, we have no choice but to charge the People with the entire 21 days occasioned by the adjournment, which brings them beyond the seven days remaining on the speedy trial clock… . People v Miller, 104500, 3rd Dept 1-9-14

 

People’s Delay In Providing Bill of Particulars Did Not Require Dismissal Under Speedy Trial Statute

The Fourth Department determined that the People’s delay in providing a bill of particulars did not require dismissal of the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute:

…[D]efendant asserted that the People’s bill of particulars was due on January 7, 2009—15 days after defendant’s request (see CPL 200.95 [2])—but that it was not served until August 10, 2009.  According to defendant, the time period from January 7 to August 10, which exceeds six months, constitutes postreadiness delay that should be charged to the People, thus warranting dismissal under CPL 30.30.  We reject that contention. Prior to their failure to serve a timely bill of particulars, the People announced their readiness for trial on the record, and “[f]ailing to serve a bill of particulars is in no way inconsistent with the prosecution’s continued readiness” … .  We addressed a similar contention in People v Runion (107 AD2d 1080), determining that “[t]he court should not have granted the motion made under CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment because of the delays of the prosecutor, after she had announced her readiness for trial, in providing discovery materials and in serving a supplemental bill of particulars.  Defendant’s remedies for such delays do not include dismissal under CPL 30.30” (id. at 1080).  People v Griffin, 1154, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

,

Failure to Move to Dismiss Indictment on Speedy Trial Grounds Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Inexcusable Post-Indictment Delay Required Dismissal

The Third Department determined defense counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring that defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea be granted, and the postindictment delay, for which the People had no adequate excuse, required that the indictment be dismissed:

A Washington County grand jury handed up a four-count sealed indictment in October 2011 charging defendant with criminal sale and possession of controlled substances occurring in September and November 2010.  An arrest warrant was issued and provided to the State Police, who for well over six months were reportedly unable to locate defendant, who had relocated, until he was arrested during a traffic stop in Chautauqua County, where he had been residing.  He was arraigned on the indictment on June 14, 2012. * * *

…[D]efendant’s ineffectiveness of counsel claim was preserved by his motion to withdraw his plea and adequately alleges that it impacted the voluntariness of his plea and appeal waiver, so as to survive both … .  Thus, we address defendant’s speedy trial claim in the context of ascertaining whether he was deprived of meaningful representation, mindful that “[a] single error of failing to raise a meritorious speedy trial claim [may be] sufficiently egregious to amount to ineffective assistance of counsel” … . * * *

The People’s fleeting description of the efforts made to locate defendant fell far short of “all reasonable efforts to enforce judicially issued warrants” … required to satisfy the “due diligence” standard (CPL 30.30 [4] [c] [i]).  As such, the People failed to meet their burden of establishing the statutory exclusion for this postindictment prereadiness delay … . Accordingly, all of this unready time would be chargeable to the People … . People v Devino, 105441, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

No Evidence Defendant Agreed to Adjournment—Indictment Dismissed on Speedy Trial Grounds

In reversing County Court and dismissing the indictment on speedy trial grounds, the Third Department noted there was no evidence the defense agreed to an adjournment during the period another criminal proceeding against the defendant was ongoing:

There is no support in the record for the People’s unsubstantiated claim that “it was agreed and understood” that defendant consented to an adjournment or waiver from March 27, 2009 until July 17, 2009.  “Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay” … .  “While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30, the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral,” and the Court of Appeals has made clear that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” … . As the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the disputed 112-day period was not chargeable to them …, the People did not establish that they were ready for trial within the statutory six-month period (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]).  Therefore, defendant was entitled to dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30. People v Smith, 104091, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

,

40 Month Pre-Trial Delay Did Not Violate Due Process

In determining a 40-month delay did not deprive defendant his right to due process, the Fourth Department wrote:

In determining whether there has been an undue delay, a court must consider several factors, including “ ‘(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay’ ” (People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 15, quoting People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445…).

Upon applying the Taranovich factors to the facts before us, we conclude that the delay did not deprive defendant of his right to due process.  We agree with defendant that the rape in the first degree charge “can only be described as serious” … .  Conversely, although the 40-month delay in commencing the prosecution was substantial, it was not per se unreasonable ….  Furthermore, defendant was not incarcerated for an extended period prior to the trial on these charges, and there is no evidence that defendant was prejudiced by the delay in commencing the prosecution.  Finally, the reason for the delay in this case was the police detective’s inability to fully identify and locate defendant.  That excuse was not unreasonable inasmuch as the victim was unable to identify defendant from mug shots or otherwise ascertain which of the 32 men in the Buffalo Police Department’s identification system with defendant’s name was the perpetrator. People v White, 817, 4th Dept 7-19-13

 

Includable/Excludable Time Under Speedy Trial Statute Explained​

The Third Department explained the principles and proof requirements with respect to excludable time under the speedy trial statute, including a detailed analysis of all the relevant types of excludable/includable time raised by the facts of the case:

Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months of incarceration, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b];…).   “Whether  the People  complied  with this obligation is ‘determined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People’s declaration of readiness, subtracting any  periods of delay that are excludable under  the terms  of the statute and  then  adding  to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People  and  are ineligible for an  exclusion'”… . People v Sydlar, 103777, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

,

17-Year Pre-Indictment Delay Did Not Violate Right to Speedy Trial

A 17-year pre-indictment delay did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  The Fourth Department wrote:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), defendant contends that the 17-year preindictment delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.We reject that contention. In examining the Taranovich factors (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445), we conclude that, although the 17-year preindictment delay was substantial, the nature of the charge was serious, and defendant remained at liberty until he was indicted. Moreover, the People met their burden of establishing a good-faith basis for the delay (see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14-16; People v Chatt, 77 AD3d 1285, 1285, lv denied 17 NY3d 793). In particular, they established that there was insufficient evidence to charge defendant shortly after the crimes occurred, and it was not until a witness gave new information to the police that identified defendant as the perpetrator and DNA testing was completed that the People brought the charges against defendant. While the delay may have caused some degree of prejudice to defendant, “ ‘a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant’ ” (Decker, 13 NY3d at 14).  People v Gaston, 176, KA 11-00406, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

, ,

Guilty Plea Precludes Appeal of Statutory Speedy Trial Violation But Not Constitutional Speedy Trial Violation

By pleading guilty a defendant forfeits appellate review of a claim that his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 30.30 was violated. However, a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim survives both a guilty plea and a waiver of the right to appeal. People v Franco, 2013 NY Slip Op 01570, 2009-10119, Ind No 10795/07, 2nd Dept. 3-13-13

 

,

19-Year Preindictment Delay Okay; Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Probative of Motive, Intent and Identity; Admissions Are Direct, Not Circumstantial, Evidence

A 19-year preindictment delay did not violate defendant’s speedy trial and due process rights. The charge was murder. The defendant was at liberty until indicted. The People established good cause for the delay in that the case was not ready to bring to a grand jury until the statements of three witnesses and DNA test results were obtained. The Fourth Department held that there was no need for a Singer hearing to determine the reason for the delay because there was no issue of fact with respect to the cause of the delay and the record provided County Court with a sufficient basis to determine whether the delay was justified. The admission of prior incidents of domestic violence against the victim (defendant’s wife) was proper because the evidence was probative of defendant’s motive, intent and identity. The defendant was not entitled to a circumstantial evidence charge because the admissions he made about killing his wife constituted direct evidence. People v Rogers, 1425, KA 11-00012 4th Dept. 2-1-13

 

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy