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No Evidence Defendant Agreed to Adjournment—Indictment Dismissed on Speedy Trial Grounds

In reversing County Court and dismissing the indictment on speedy trial grounds, the Third Department noted there was no evidence the defense agreed to an adjournment during the period another criminal proceeding against the defendant was ongoing:

There is no support in the record for the People’s unsubstantiated claim that “it was agreed and understood” that defendant consented to an adjournment or waiver from March 27, 2009 until July 17, 2009.  “Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay” … .  “While a defendant may waive rights under CPL 30.30, the record here contains no evidence of any waiver, written or oral,” and the Court of Appeals has made clear that “prosecutors would be well advised to obtain unambiguous written waivers in situations like these” … . As the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the disputed 112-day period was not chargeable to them …, the People did not establish that they were ready for trial within the statutory six-month period (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]).  Therefore, defendant was entitled to dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30. People v Smith, 104091, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

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