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17-Year Pre-Indictment Delay Did Not Violate Right to Speedy Trial

A 17-year pre-indictment delay did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  The Fourth Department wrote:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), defendant contends that the 17-year preindictment delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.We reject that contention. In examining the Taranovich factors (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445), we conclude that, although the 17-year preindictment delay was substantial, the nature of the charge was serious, and defendant remained at liberty until he was indicted. Moreover, the People met their burden of establishing a good-faith basis for the delay (see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14-16; People v Chatt, 77 AD3d 1285, 1285, lv denied 17 NY3d 793). In particular, they established that there was insufficient evidence to charge defendant shortly after the crimes occurred, and it was not until a witness gave new information to the police that identified defendant as the perpetrator and DNA testing was completed that the People brought the charges against defendant. While the delay may have caused some degree of prejudice to defendant, “ ‘a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant’ ” (Decker, 13 NY3d at 14).  People v Gaston, 176, KA 11-00406, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

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