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Because the “Identity” of the Perpetrator Was Not an Issue, Allowing Evidence of Prior Crimes to Prove Identity Was Reversible Error.

In a case based upon allegations the defendant assaulted his wife in a jealous rage, the trial judge allowed evidence of a prior crime to prove the “identity” of the perpetrator pursuant to the Molineux rule. The Second Department, in a prior decision, reversed the conviction finding that the perpetrator’s identity was not an issue in the case. After the initial reversal by the Second Department, the Court of Appeals, in turn, reversed the Second Department finding that the perpetrator’s identity had not been “conclusively established,” and sent the case back to determine if the identity exception was applicable to the facts. The Second Department stuck to its initial reasoning, finding that allowing the “prior crime” evidence on the issue of the perpetrator’s “identity” was an abuse of discretion because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. People vs Agina, 2005-11978, Ind. No. 1733/04 Second Dept. 2-13-13

 

Flight Provided Justification for Pursuit.

Because the defendant resembled a “mug shot” of a wanted person, the police had the right to approach him to request information. Because the defendant was in an area the wanted person was known to frequent, the police had the common-law right to inquire.  The defendant’s flight provided reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop him.  The defendant’s discarding of a gun during the chase, therefore, was not the result of improper police action.  People vs Barrow, 2011-030059, Ind. No. 1356/09 Second Dept. 2-13-13

DeBour, street stops

“Zone of Danger” Theory Applies Only to Immediate Family.

The Second Department determined the “zone of danger” theory of recovery for witnessing the death of someone in the plaintiff’s “immediate family” did not allow recovery for witnessing the death of a man, not plaintiff’s biological father, who was the only person plaintiff had ever known as a father figure.  Thompson vs Dhaiti, 2011-11215, Index No. 24951/09 Second Dept. 2-13-13

 

Settlement Without Insurer’s Consent.

When an insured settles with a tortfeasor in violation of a condition requiring his or her insurer’s written consent to settle, and fails to preserve the insurer’s subrogation rights, the insurer is prejudiced, and the insured is prohibited from asserting a claim for underinsured motorist benefits …”. Matter of Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company vs Kanner, 2012-02625, Index No. 16172/11 Second Dept. 2-13-13

 

Refusing to Provide Relevant Information to an Inmate Required Annulment of the Determination.

In a prison disciplinary proceeding, the hearing officer’s refusal to provide the inmate with the instructions for the operation of the machine which was used to test his urine for the presence of drugs required annulment of the determination the prisoner had used a controlled substance.  Matter of Marshall vs Fischer, 2012-01538, Index No. 6260/11 Second Dept. 2-13-13

 

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Doctrines Do Not Apply to “Nominal Parties” or to Prior Proceedings With Lower Standard of Proof.

This decision includes a clear discussion of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the (non)application of those doctrines to a “nominal party,” and the (non)application of those doctrines to a prior proceeding with a lower standard of proof.  Matter of Sherwyn Toppin Marketing Consultants, Inc. vs New York State Liquor Authority, 2012-01119, Index No. 24980/11 Second Dept. 2-6-13

 

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“Alter Ego” of Entity Which Employed Plaintiff Protected by Worker’s Compensation Law.

“The protection against lawsuits brought by injured workers that is afforded to employers by Workers’ Compensation Law [sections] 22 and 29(6) also extends to entities that are alter egos of the entity which employs the plaintiff …”. Quizhpe vs Luvin Construction Corp., 2012-01175, Index No. 21761/06 Second Dept. 2-6-13

 

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No “Reasonable Suspicion,” Defendant Should Not Have Been Stopped and Detained.

A new trial was ordered and the defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence was granted by the Second Department.  A police radio broadcast described a robbery in progress by two males wearing black jackets, one wearing blue jeans, the other wearing black jeans. The complainant described the robbers only as “wearing dark clothing,” one taller than the other, and one with a hood.  The Court held that these descriptions were not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant, who was dressed in a dark gray and dark green camouflage jacket and was standing alone 20 blocks from the crime scene.  People v Polhill, 2010-01680, Ind. No. 943/09 Second Dept. 1-30-13

DeBour, street stops

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Queens County District Attorney’s Standard “Preamble” to the Miranda Warnings Struck Down.

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Skelos, the Second Department struck down a so-called “program” which had been put in place by the Queens County District Attorney’s Office.  Pursuant to the “program,” a “preamble” was read to the defendant just before the Miranda warnings were given.  The Second Department determined the preamble rendered the Miranda warnings ineffective.  The Court noted that the defendant was told of his privilege against self-incrimination only after being told (in the preamble) that this was his “only opportunity” to refute what others have said, to correct any misperceptions, and to try to help himself.  The preamble suggested that the prosecutor would not investigate his version of events if he declined to speak with the prosecutor at that time.  Conversely the preamble suggested that, if the defendant agreed to be interviewed, the prosecutor would assist him with such an investigation.  This suggestion, the Second Department held, “is contrary to the very purpose of the warning that anything a suspect says can be used against him … . In essence, the preamble suggests that invoking [the right to remain silent] will bear adverse, and irrevocable, consequences.”  People v Dunbar, 2010-04786, Ind. No. 1217/09 Second Dept. 1-30-13

 

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Insufficient Proof of Value in Grand Larceny Case.

In a Grand Larceny 3rd case, based on the theft of cell phones, the value of the stolen phones was proved by the testimony of the store manager who did not provide “a basis of knowledge” for her statement of value.  The Second Department noted that “ ‘[c]onclusory statements and rough estimates of value’ that are unsupported by a basis of knowledge are insufficient…”. The conviction was reduced to petit larceny, which requires no proof of value.  People v Sutherland, 2011-06497, Ind. No. 12436/08 Second Dept. 1-23-13

 

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