You are here: / Second Department

Tag Archive for: Second Department

Conflicting Evidence About Whether Attorney Discharged for Cause (Thereby Prohibiting Recovery of Attorneys Fees) Required Hearing

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have ruled that an attorney was not discharged for cause, thereby entitling the attorney to attorneys fees, without a hearing, because there was conflicting evidence on the issue.  The court explained when an attorney who has been discharged is entitled to attorneys fees:

A client has “an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney” … . Where the discharge is without cause, the attorney may recover the reasonable value of his or her services in quantum meruit … . In contrast, “[a]n attorney who is discharged for cause . . . is not entitled to compensation or a lien” … . An attorney who violates a disciplinary rule may be discharged for cause and is not entitled to fees for any services rendered … .

“Where there are conflicting claims as to . . . whether an outgoing attorney was discharged with or without cause, a hearing is necessary to resolve such dispute”… . Schultz v Hughes, 2013 NY slip Op 05891, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

, ,

Evidence Supported Finding Certificate of Acknowledgment Attached to Deed Was Forged

In affirming the trial court’s determination a power of attorney (a certificate of acknowledgment) had been forged, thereby rendering a deed and five mortgages void, the Second Department wrote:

“A certificate of acknowledgment attached to an instrument such as a deed raises a presumption of due execution” … . “[A] certificate of acknowledgment should not be overthrown upon evidence of a doubtful character, such as the unsupported testimony of interested witnesses, nor upon a bare preponderance of evidence, but only on proof so clear and convincing so as to amount to a moral certainty” … . …

…[W]e find on this record that there nonetheless existed clear and convincing evidence that the power of attorney was in fact forged, particularly in light of the undisputed evidence showing that the plaintiff, as the former owner of the subject property, received no consideration from the sale of the property or from the subject mortgage loans. Neuman v Neuman, 2013 NY Slip Op 05885, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

,

Authenticity of Document Not Demonstrated

In finding the existence of a contract had not been demonstrated, the Second Department explained the relevant evidentiary rules concerning the authenticity of a document submitted as proof of a contract:

The general rule is that “[a] writing is ordinarily not relevant at trial unless evidence had been introduced to show that it was made, signed or adopted by a particular person” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence, § 9-101 [2008]). “A private document offered to prove the existence of a valid contract cannot be admitted into evidence unless its authenticity and genuineness are first properly established” … . The authenticity of a document may be established by submitting the document with a certificate of acknowledgment …, which was not done here. Nor was any other evidence submitted as to the validity of the documents in issue. Fairlane Fin Corp v Greater Metro Agency, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 05875, 9-18-13

 

,

Question of Fact Whether General Releases Encompassed Environmental Damage from Leaking Fuel Tank

The Second Department determined that there was a question whether general releases contemplated damages related to environmental contamination and the action should not have been dismissed based on the releases. The action concerned gasoline which had leaked into the ground when defendant had leased the plaintiff’s property.  The court explained:

Generally, a valid release completely bars an action on a claim that is the subject of the release … . Principles of contract law govern the interpretation of a release; “a release that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms'” … . Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals has recognized with respect to a general release, “[t]here is little doubt . . . that its interpretation and limitation by the parol evidence rule are subject to special rules. These rules are based on a realistic recognition that releases contain standardized, even ritualistic, language and are given in circumstances where the parties are sometimes looking no further than the precise matter in dispute that is being settled. Thus, while it has been held that an unreformed general release will be given its full literal effect where it is directly or circumstantially evident that the purpose is to achieve a truly general settlement …, the cases are many in which the release has been avoided with respect to uncontemplated transactions despite the generality of the language in the release form” … .

Further, “[t]he meaning and extent of coverage of a release necessarily depend, as in the case of contracts generally, upon the controversy being settled and upon the purpose for which the release was actually given'” … . A general release may not be construed to cover matters that the parties “did not desire or intend to dispose of” … .

Here, the two releases at issue, whether construed together or separately, are ambiguous regarding whether the parties intended that they cover unknown claims for environmental contamination… .  Burnside 711 LLC v Amerada Hess Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 05869, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

No Evidence Release Invalidated by Fraud or Duress

In upholding the validity of a release, the Second Department explained the relevant principles:

” A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law'” … . “A release may be invalidated . . . for any of the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements'” … . However, “a signed release shifts the burden of going forward . . . to the [plaintiff] to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release'” … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was fraud, duress, or some other fact sufficient to void the release. Davis v Rochdale Vil, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 05874, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

, ,

Petition Seeking Revocation of Building Permit Should Have Named the Director Who Had the Power to Revoke It

In affirming the grant of a building permit by the village board of appeals (BOA), the Second Department noted that only Director of Building, Code Enforcement and Land Use Administration had the power to revoke a building permit and therefore the Director should have been named in the Article 78 proceeding seeking revocation: …[I]n a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 which seeks to compel a body or officer to perform a duty imposed by law, the proceeding must be commenced against the body or officer whose performance is sought (see CPLR 7803). The petitioners sought to compel the BOA to revoke the building permit and any subsequently issued certificate of occupancy. However, only the Director is empowered to do so (see Village Code §§ 126-7, 126-12, 126-15). Thus, the petitioners should have named and joined the Director as a party to this proceeding … .  Matter of Lucas v Board of Appeals of Vil of Mamaroneck, 2013 NY Slip Op 05908, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

,

Termination of Participation in Affordable Housing Program Is Not a Taxable Transfer

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Cohen, the Second Department determined that when a residential housing cooperative amends its certificate of incorporation as part of a voluntary dissolution, reconstitution, and termination of participation in the Mitchell-Lama housing program (Private Housing Finance Law section 10 et seq, an affordable housing program established in 1955) there is no transfer or conveyance of real property or an interest in real property and, therefore, no taxable event occurs under Tax Law section 1201(b) (i.e., no real property transfer tax [RPTT] is due).  This opinion replaced the opinion in Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc v City of New York, 100 AD3d 170, which is recalled and vacated. Trump Vil Section 3, Inc v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 05894, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

Ownership Acquired by Adverse Possession Demonstrated

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and determined plaintiffs had proved ownership of a strip of land by adverse possession:

…[W]e conclude that the plaintiffs demonstrated ownership to the subject strip through adverse possession. ” A party seeking to obtain title by adverse possession must prove by clear and convincing evidence . . . that (1) the possession was hostile and under claim of right; (2) it was actual; (3) it was open and notorious; (4) it was exclusive; and (5) it was continuous for the statutory period of 10 years'” … . Additionally, since the adverse possession claim is not founded upon a written instrument, the plaintiffs must establish, in accordance with the law in effect at the time this action was commenced, that the disputed property was either “usually cultivated or improved” or “protected by a substantial inclosure” (RPAPL former 522…).

Here, the plaintiffs demonstrated that, by building and maintaining a wall along the subject strip, which was styled to match their house and attached to a gate attached to their house, they continually possessed the subject strip, for more than 10 years, in a manner that was open and notorious, exclusive, and inimical to the rights of the [defendants’] predecessor… . Marone v Kally, 2013 NY Slip Op 05882, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

,

Planning Board Should Not Have Added Conditions for Approval of Final Plat Plan

The Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s determination that the planning board’s denial of approval of a final plat plan was arbitrary and capricious.  The Court determined that the planning board was aware of the variance upon which the denial was based (involving the transfer of sanitary flow credits) at the time it approved the preliminary plat plan:

Although the Planning Board’s approval of the preliminary plat in April 2010 did not guarantee approval of the final version (see Town Law § 276[4]), a planning board may not, in the absence of significant new information, deny final approval if a property owner implements the modifications or conditions required by a preliminary approval (…Terry Rice, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 61, Town Law § 276 Preliminary Review). Here, the Planning Board had long known that the SCDHS’s approval of a Suffolk County Sanitary Code variance was based on the transfer of sanitary flow credits and, indeed, the Planning Board specifically referenced that transfer in its April 2010 conditional preliminary approval. Inasmuch as no significant new information came to light after the Planning Board gave its approval to the preliminary plat, its imposition of additional requirements in the conditional final approval was, as the Supreme Court correctly held, arbitrary and capricious… . Matter of Nickart Realty Corp v Southold Town Planning Bd, 2013 NY Slip Op 05909, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

Variance Properly Granted/Review Criteria Explained

The Second Department, after noting that an application for a variance can be made by an agent for the property owner, determined the Board of Zoning Appeals had properly granted the lot-width variances.  In explaining the court’s role in reviewing variances, the court wrote:

…”[L]ocal zoning boards are vested with broad discretion in considering applications for area variances, and [c]ourts may set aside a zoning board determination only where the record reveals that the board acted illegally or arbitrarily, or abused its discretion, or that it merely succumbed to generalized community pressure'” … . A variance determination of a zoning board should be sustained if it has a rational basis and is not arbitrary and capricious … .

Here, the Board properly balanced the requisite statutory factors, and its determination that the benefit to the applicant of the requested variances outweighed the detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious (see Town Law § 267-b[3][b]…). Among other things, the Board found that, despite a few wide lots in the vicinity of the premises, the majority of lots in the uninterrupted two-block segment of Bayview Avenue in which the subject premises were located had a width of 50 feet or less, and, thus, that the variances would not produce an undesirable change in the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to nearby properties. Matter of Huszar v Bayview Park Props LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 05906, 2nd Dept 9-18-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy