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ARBITRATION HEARING HELD ON A SUNDAY VIOLATED THE JUDICIARY LAW, AWARD VACATED.

The Second Department determined an arbitration award had to be vacated because the proceedings were held on a Sunday in violation of the Judiciary Law:

Since the arbitration hearing was conducted on a Sunday in violation of Judiciary Law § 5, which “expresses the public policy of the State, and cannot be waived,” the arbitration award is illegal and void … . Accordingly, the award is vacated and the proceeding is dismissed. Matter of Leifer v Gross, 2016 NY Slip Op 04715, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

ARBITRATION (ARBITRATION HEARING HELD ON A SUNDAY VIOLATED THE JUDICIARY LAW, AWARD VACATED)/JUDICIARY LAW (ARBITRATION HEARING HELD ON A SUNDAY VIOLATED THE JUDICIARY LAW, AWARD VACATED)/SUNDAYS (ARBITRATION HEARING HELD ON A SUNDAY VIOLATED THE JUDICIARY LAW, AWARD VACATED)

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LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES.

The Second Department determined the value of properties transferred upon decedent's death was the fair market value at the time of death. The fact that decedent willed life estates in the properties did not diminish the value of the properties for estate tax purposes:

“Because the estate tax is a tax on the privilege of transferring property upon one's death, the property to be valued for estate tax purposes is that which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the interest held by the decedent before death or that held by the legatee after death” … . An estate tax taxes “not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death” … . “The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate … is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death” … . An estate tax is a tax on the privilege of passing on property, not a tax on the privilege of receiving property; “[t]he tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of the property by the legatees” … .

Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the life estates in the condominium and cooperative apartment granted by the decedent to his longtime companion upon the decedent's death did not diminish the value of those properties for estate tax purposes and should not have been taken into account on the estate tax return. Matter of Cleary, 2016 NY Slip Op 04410, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/TAX LAW (ESTATE TAX, (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)/ESTATE TAX (LIFE ESTATES IN A CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENT DID NOT DIMINISH VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants in this action alleging trespass and nuisance caused by water runoff:

A landowner will not be liable for damages to abutting property caused by the flow of surface water due to improvements to his or her land, provided that the improvements were made in good faith to make the property fit for some rational use, and that the water was not drained onto the other property by artificial means, such as pipes and ditches … . …

… [P]laintiffs raised triable issues of fact … by adducing evidence, inter alia, that a gutter downspout located on the defendants’ property and a drainage pipe installed under the low point in the defendants’ new driveway diverted rainwater runoff onto the plaintiffs’ properties … . Biaglow v Elite Prop. Holdings, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 04373, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

REAL PROPERTY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/TRESPASS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/NUISANCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)/WATER RUNOFF (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WATER RUNOFF CONSTITUTED TRESPASS AND NUISANCE)

DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS.

The Second Department determined the “duplicate coverage” prohibition in the supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) endorsement of the GEICO policy did not prevent plaintiff's widow, Maria Sherlock, from proceeding to arbitration seeking coverage under the endorsement. The driver, Maldonado, who struck and killed plaintiff's decedent had a policy with $50,000 coverage. Maldonado's insurer settled for its $50,000 limit. Because the accident occurred during a police chase and the municipality was sued, the municipality's insurer settled for $425,000.  Geico argued any recovery under the SUM endorsement would constitute prohibited duplicate coverage. Maria Sherlock argued the overall damages were in the millions and recovery of difference between the $250,000 SUM limit and the $50,000 paid out under defendant's policy would therefore not be duplicative, even taking into account the $425,000 recovery from the municipality:

The key to a proper understanding of [the duplicate coverage prohibition] is the recognition that “shall not duplicate” is not aimed at preventing an insured from seeking full compensation by combining partial recoveries from several tortfeasors, but at preventing double recoveries for their bodily injuries.

… Sherlock alleged in her request for arbitration that the bodily injury damages are in the millions of dollars. Presumably, if the Maldonado defendants' policy had contained the same $250,000 liability limit that the GEICO policy provided, … Sherlock would have been able to obtain $250,000 from the Maldonado defendants' insurer as well as the $425,000 from the [municipal] defendants' insurer. … Sherlock seeks only, through her claim under the SUM endorsement—for which she paid a premium—to be in the same position she would have been in had the Maldonado defendants not been underinsured relative to the GEICO policy. Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Sherlock, 2016 NY Slip Op 04414, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

INSURANCE LAW (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)/NON-DUPLICATION PROVISION (DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS)

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JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS.

The Second Department determined the Family Court judge was biased against mother who sought to prevent her children from being immunized for religious reasons:

Public Health Law § 2164, which requires that an adequate dose or doses of an immunizing agent against certain diseases be administered to children at various intervals, does not apply to children whose parent or parents hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practices required therein (see Public Health Law § 2164[9]). When a parent seeks to assert a religious objection to immunization under Public Health Law § 2164(9), he or she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her opposition to immunization ” stems from genuinely-held religious beliefs'” … . * * *

Here, the record demonstrates that the Family Court had a predetermined outcome of the case in mind during the hearing. In addition to certain comments made by the court regarding the sincerity of the mother’s religious beliefs, the court took an adversarial stance, aggressively cross-examined the mother, continually interrupted her testimony, mocked her beliefs, and generally demonstrated bias. The Family Court’s bias unjustly affected the result of the hearing to the detriment of the mother. Matter of Baby Girl Z. (Yaroslava Z.), 2016 NY Slip Op 04425, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

FAMILY LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/JUDGES (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/IMMUNIZATION (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)/RELIGION (JUDGE WAS BIASED AGAINST MOTHER WHO SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE IMMUNIZATION OF HER CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS)

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED FATHER VISITATION BASED UPON FATHER’S BEHAVIOR WHEN MOTHER TESTIFIED; FUTURE VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED UPON DRUG SCREENINGS AND A MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION.

The Second Department determined father’s in-court actions during mother’s testimony did not provide a sufficient basis for the denial of visitation to father. In addition, the Second Department found that Family Court improperly conditioned future visitation by father upon the results of drug screenings and a mental health evaluation:

… Family Court’s determination to deny the father visitation with the parties’ children is not supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. ” [V]isitation is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and of the child'” … . “As a general rule, some form of visitation by the noncustodial parent is always appropriate, absent exceptional circumstances, such as those in which it would be inimical to the welfare of the child or where a parent in some manner has forfeited his or her right to such access'”… .

Here, the Family Court improperly based its determination to deny the father parental access upon the father’s in-court demeanor … , including his inability “to control his temper in open Court” and an instance in which he called the mother “a liar” as she testified. However, no correlation was made between the father’s in-court demeanor and any detrimental effect on the children … . * * *

The Family Court also erred in directing the father to submit to random drug and alcohol screens, test negative, and undergo a comprehensive mental health evaluation as conditions of future visitation. “A court hearing a pending proceeding or action involving issues of custody or visitation may properly order a mental health evaluation of a parent, if warranted, prior to making a custody or visitation determination” … . A court may also “direct a party to submit to counseling or treatment as a component of a visitation or custody order” … . A court may not, however, ” order that a parent undergo counseling or treatment as a condition of future visitation or reapplication for visitation rights'” … . Matter of Gonzalez v Ross, 2016 NY Slip Op 04413, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED FATHER VISITATION BASED UPON FATHER’S BEHAVIOR WHEN MOTHER TESTIFIED; FUTURE VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED UPON DRUG SCREENINGS AND A MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION)/VISITATION (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED FATHER VISITATION BASED UPON FATHER’S BEHAVIOR WHEN MOTHER TESTIFIED; FUTURE VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED UPON DRUG SCREENINGS AND A MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION)

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DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted.  The detective investigating a burglary entered the curtilage of defendant’s home without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances:

Here, in entering the defendant’s fenced-in rear yard by opening the gate and going through it, the detective entered the curtilage of the defendant’s home … . The People have failed to articulate any exigent circumstances justifying this intrusion and the ensuing warrantless arrest and search … . People v Avinger, 2016 NY Slip Op 04426, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CURTILAGE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SUPPRESSION (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/WARRANTLESS SEARCH (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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MOTION TO RENEW IN WHICH DOCUMENT PREVIOUSLY REJECTED WAS RESUBMITTED IN ADMISSIBLE FORM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have entertained a motion to renew in which a document previously rejected because it was not in admissible form was resubmitted in admissible form:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to renew. “CPLR 2221 (e) has not been construed so narrowly as to disqualify, as new facts not offered on the prior motion, facts contained in a document originally rejected for consideration because the document was not in admissible form” … . Here, the inadvertent mistake of the plaintiff's attorney in including the unnotarized statement of the chiropractor with the plaintiff's opposition papers, rather than the notarized affidavit, was tantamount to law office failure and constituted a reasonable justification for the plaintiff's failure to provide the affidavit to the court in opposing the original motion … . Defina v Daniel, 2016 NY Slip Op 04381, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE ((MOTION TO RENEW IN WHICH DOCUMENT PREVIOUSLY REJECTED WAS RESUBMITTED IN ADMISSIBLE FORM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/RENEW, MOTION TO (MOTION TO RENEW IN WHICH DOCUMENT PREVIOUSLY REJECTED WAS RESUBMITTED IN ADMISSIBLE FORM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE ((MOTION TO RENEW IN WHICH DOCUMENT PREVIOUSLY REJECTED WAS RESUBMITTED IN ADMISSIBLE FORM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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TOWN DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THEORIES OF LIABILITY RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED ON THAT GROUND.

The Second Department determined the town did not make the requisite showing for summary judgment in this slip and fall case. The town's motion did not address all of the theories of liability raised in the pleadings:

Here, the plaintiff, in her pleadings, alleged that the Town created the hole in the parking lot that caused her to fall, and that the Town made a special use of the parking lot. Thus, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the Town was required to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not have prior written notice of the allegedly defective condition, that it did not create the condition, and that it did not make a special use of the parking lot … . Since the Town failed to make this showing, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Breest v Long Is. R.R., 2016 NY Slip Op 04376, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

NEGLIGENCE (TOWN DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THEORIES OF LIABILITY RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED ON THAT GROUND)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, TOWN DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THEORIES OF LIABILITY RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED ON THAT GROUND)/SLIP AND FALL (TOWN DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THEORIES OF LIABILITY RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED ON THAT GROUND)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION.

The Second Department determined questions of fact precluded defendant's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff alleged the stairway where she fell was defective in that the treads were too narrow and the handrail was tight against the wall. Defendant argued the condition was open and obvious:

“A landowner must act as a reasonable [person] in maintaining his [or her] property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” … , and must warn of any dangerous or defective condition of which he or she has actual or constructive notice … . However, “[a] property owner has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition, which as a matter of law is not inherently dangerous” … .

Here, the defendant, who relied only on the plaintiff's deposition testimony in support of her motion, failed to establish, prima facie, that the dimensions of the stairs and the position of the handrail were not inherently dangerous as a matter of law … . Rigatti v Geba, 2016 NY Slip Op 04193, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)/STAIRS  (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STAIRS AND HANDRAIL CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)

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